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In 2008 the world witnessed a transformational shift in its financial services with the 
introduction and subsequent adoption of cryptocurrencies. The self-regulatory nature of 
cryptocurrencies is an attractive feature for its users. Unfortunately, this feature is equally as 
attractive for criminal use. It is for this reason that in 2018 the Financial Action Task Force 
amended its regulatory Recommendations to extend the obligations of anti-money laundering 
and combating the financing of terrorism to cryptocurrency service providers and users. In turn, 
jurisdictions such as the European Union have amended their anti-money laundering laws to 
give the Recommendations effect. 
However, cryptocurrency transactions are presently unregulated in Namibia, despite the 
country also being a member state of the Financial Action Task Force. Namibia’s concerns 
surrounding cryptocurrencies are in no way limited to their ability to corrupt the integrity of its 
financial industry, but also their ability to evade Namibia’s capital and exchange controls. 
These controls preserve Namibia’s foreign reserves which can theoretically be under threat by 
pseudonymous cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. Consequently, the imminent threat 
which these transactions pose, in their current form void of regulation, can arguably be 
quantified by their lack of transparency, accountability, and their jurisdictional concerns.  
Notably, cryptocurrencies have the ability to lower the entry level for financial inclusion 
and have the potential to propel Namibia’s economic growth if cultivated correctly. Therefore, 
this dissertation examines whether the licensing of cryptocurrency service providers within 
Namibia can remedy the ills that plague cross-border cryptocurrency transactions, in order to 
safeguard the integrity of Namibia’s financial industry and ensure the preservation of its foreign 




I. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
It is globally accepted that an economically stable country should have a central banking 
system.1 Namibia, as a sovereign country,2 provides in Article 128 of its Constitution3 for a 
central bank, namely the Bank of Namibia (Bank). To execute the operations traditionally 
entrusted to central banks.4  
The core operations include ensuring monetary and financial stability.5 As such, the Bank 
is responsible for safeguarding the solvency of Namibia.6 This is done by the preservation of 
Namibia’s foreign reserves through capital and exchange controls, and further implementing 
robust monetary policy mechanisms.7 The monetary policies implemented by the Bank are in 
line with that of the Common Monetary Area (CMA),8 which comprises of South Africa,9 
Namibia,10 Lesotho and eSwatini.11 The Agreement that established the CMA requires its 
member states to have moderate monetary policy autonomy.12 It is for this reason that Namibia 
anchors its foreign exchange rate with the South African Rand.13 This arrangement requires 
Namibia to ensure that the value of its fiat money (money) is guaranteed by foreign reserves,14 
which the Bank regulates robustly.   
Another important regulator for the purpose of this dissertation is Namibia’s Financial 
Intelligence Centre (Centre)15 which is entrusted with combatting money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism.16 As signatory to the United Nations Convention against Transnational  
 
1 Vera C. Smith The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative Liberty Press, England (1936) 
3.    
2 ‘Sovereignty’ is the monopolist authority of a country to self-govern within its geographical territory, according 
to John Dugard SC et al Dugard's International Law: a South African Perspective 5 ed (2018) 210. There is no 
differentiation in the ranking of countries’ sovereignty see, Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. 
3 The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990, as amended (Constitution).  
4 Article 128 of the Constitution.  
5 Section 3(a) of the Bank of Namibia Act 15 of 1997, as amended. (Bank of Namibia Act). 
6 Section 3(a) of the Bank of Namibia Act. 
7 Bank of Namibia Website ‘Bank of Namibia Monetary Policy Framework’ (2008) ISBN: 99916-61-50-6 at 2 
available at https://www.bon.com.na/Bank/Monetary-Policy/Monetary-Policy-Framework.aspx accessed on 21 
June 2019. 
8 Ibid.  




12 Bank of Namibia op cit note 7 at 2. 
13 Bank of Namibia op cit note 7 at 3. IMF op cit note 9 at 10. 
14 Bank of Namibia op cit note 7 at 2. 
15 Established in terms of s 7 of the Financial Intelligence Act No. 13 of 2012, as amended (Financial Intelligence 
Act). 
16 In terms of s 9 of the Financial Intelligence Act. 
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Organized Crime 2000, Namibia actively regulates and criminalises money laundering and 
terrorism financing using three key legislation.17 
Nevertheless, the advancements within the digital environment, like cryptocurrencies18 
have progressed at a speed that has left regulators in low- and middle-income countries battling 
to remain abreast with them.19 These countries could benefit the most from these technological 
advancements,20 because they decrease costs and facilitate the execution of services that have 
not been realised or were otherwise hindered by conventional industries.21  
It is, however, important to remain mindful of the inherent risks that plague these 
technological advancements such as cryptocurrencies. The risks that will be examined for the 
purpose of this dissertation are, the evasion of Namibia’s anti-money laundering and combating 
the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws, as well as its capital and exchange controls and 
whether it is possible to regulate cryptocurrencies through licensing to limit these risks.  
The regulation of cryptocurrencies has received a considerable amount of scholarly 
attention. Amongst these are, Nicola Ann Harvey who argues that cryptocurrencies should be 
classified as money in South African law.22 This dissertation builds on Harvey’s compelling 
argument. While Hossein Nabilouhas advocated for indirectly regulating cryptocurrency 
through its service providers.23 Karabo Mothokoa and Mildred Melina Gomachas make a 
similar argument for South Africa,24 Kenya and Nigeria,25 respectively   
 
17 Financial Intelligence Act, Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation Activities Act No. 4 of 
2014, as amended and Prevention of Organised Crime Act 29 of 2004, amended. For the purpose of this 
dissertation emphasis will be placed on the Financial Intelligence Act. 
18 Susan Alkadri ‘Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of 
Exchange?’ (2018) vol.17 no.1 Duke Law & Technology Review 71 defines cryptocurrencies as ‘decentralized 
virtual currencies utilizing a “cryptographic protocol that manages the creation of new units of the currency 
through a peer-to-peer network’. While Lexico defines cryptocurrency as ‘a digital currency in which encryption 
techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, operating 
independently of a central bank’ Oxford Dictionary, available at 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cryptocurrency, accessed on 12 August 2019. This dissertation will use the 
term cryptocurrency as it builds on the assumption that the legal classification of cryptocurrencies should be that 
of money as oppose to an asset.  
19 Sephooko I. Motelle ‘The Race of Innovation in Financial Services and the Regulatory Chase: Some Thoughts 
on the Regulation of Crypto-Currencies’ (2017) vol. 3 no.4 Development Finance Agenda 8. 
20 Vera Songwe ‘A Digital Africa’ June 2019 vol. 56 no. 2 Finance & Development 1 available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/06/digital-africa-songwe.htm accessed on 21 June 2019. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Nicola Ann Harvey The Legal Classification of Cryptocurrency in South African Law: An Argument for 
Classification as Currency (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2019). 
23 Hossein Nabilou ‘How to Regulate Bitcoin? Decentralized Regulation for a Decentralized Cryptocurrency’ 
(2019) International Journal of Law and Information Technology.  
24 Karabo Mothokoa Regulating Crypto-currencies in South Africa: The need for an effective Legal Framework 
to mitigate the associated risks (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2017). 
25 Roswitha Mildred Melina Gomachas Cryptocurrency Intermediation In Africa: Towards A Regulatory 
Framework For Cryptocurrency Intermediaries (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2018).  
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While Byron Titmas recommends the regulation of cryptocurrencies in South Africa in terms 
of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002.26    
Moreover, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has provided Recommendations27 
and a subsequent Guidance for the regulation of cryptocurrencies service providers,28 however, 
the FATF limits its guidance to a purely AML/CFT perspective. While the paper by Raphael 
Auer and Stijn Claessens argue that although cross-border cryptocurrencies are decentralised 
they rely on the financial industry and as such can be regulated.29 This dissertation is thus novel 
in that it examines the oversight in terms of cross-border cryptocurrency regulation from a 
Namibian perspective. 
(a) Principal Research Question and Research Objective 
This dissertation has two interlinked research questions. First, can cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions be regulated in Namibia? If affirmative, what provisions should feature in 
Namibia’s regulation for cross-border cryptocurrency transactions, in order to secure the 
efficacy of such regulation? Therefore, this dissertation intends to propose a regulatory 
framework for cross-border cryptocurrency transactions for Namibia. This will be done by 
critically evaluating whether the licensing of cryptocurrency service providers (service 
providers) in Namibia can remedy the ills that plague cryptocurrencies. Such ills include, 
pseudonymous transacting, jurisdictional concerns and evasion of laws which may in theory 
result in the depletion of Namibia’s foreign reserves and the use of the financial industry for 
illegal purposes. As such, the laws that will be examined are those relating to capital and 
exchange controls as well as AML/CFT laws. In providing the framework for Namibia’s cross-
border cryptocurrency regulation, an appropriate balance will be struck between fostering 
innovation while at the same time safeguarding the integrity of Namibia’s financial industry 
and preserving its foreign reserves.  
(b) Assumptions  
In order to facilitate the discussion in this dissertation, it will deploy two interlinked 
assumptions. First, although cryptocurrencies do not have intrinsic value such as gold, they  
 
26 Byron Titmas Regulating Bitcoin in South Africa: a Comparative Study (unpublished LLM thesis, University 
of the Cape Town, 2019).  
27 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (June 2019) (FATF Recommendations).  
28 FATF ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (June 2019) 
(FATF Guidance).  
29 Raphael Auer & Stijn Claessens ‘Regulating Cryptocurrencies: Assessing Market Reactions’ (September 2018) 




nevertheless have value,30 even if that value is purely speculative. Therefore, for the purpose 
of this dissertation cryptocurrencies will be considered to have value.  
The second assumption is that the legal classification of cryptocurrencies is that of 
money. Namibian legislation provides a definition for legal tender which is money minted or 
printed under the authority of the Bank.31 As such, cryptocurrencies fall short of legal tender 
status in Namibia. Until recently cryptocurrencies could have been classified as ‘foreign 
currency’32 in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
However, late last year the Bank of Namibia Bill33 was passed which was gazetted on 
the 4th February 2020.34 And awaits commencement from the Minister of Finance. The Bank 
of Namibia ‘Bill’ defines ‘currency’35 as ‘… a note or coin issued by the Bank and includes 
any note or coin which is legal tender in Namibia.’36 This definition expressly excludes any 
possible interpretation that a decentralised cryptocurrency can be money in Namibia. 
Consequently, this change in law arguably places cryptocurrencies within the regulatory 
sphere of the Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority who is responsible for 
regulating non-banks in the financial industry.37 Nevertheless, this dissertation recommends 
and therefore assumes that cryptocurrency should be considered as foreign money in 
Namibia.38 This assumption is further supported by Italy’s Inland Revenue which also 
considers cryptocurrencies as foreign money in its Resoluzione N72/E of the 2nd September 
2016.  
 
30 See European Banking Authority Opinion on ‘Virtual Currencies’ EBA/Op/2014/08 (4 July 2014) 
that ‘defines virtual currencies as a digital representation of value’ 11.  
31 In terms of s 20 of the Bank of Namibia Act 15 of 1997, as amended (Bank of Namibia Act). In terms of s 26 
of the Bank of Namibia Act the South African Rand is also legal tender in Namibia. 
32 Foreign currency is defined as ‘any currency which is not legal tender in the Republic and includes …any other 
instrument for the payment of currency payable in a currency unit which is not legal tender in the Republic’, in 
terms of s 1 of the Exchange Control Regulations, 1961 (Exchange Control Regulations) issued under s 9 of the 
Currency and Exchanges Act 9 of 1933 (Exchange Control Act).  
33 Bank of Namibia Bill B. 1 – 2019 (Bank of Namibia Bill). Notably, digital transactions in Namibia will have 
an improved legal footing with the passing and subsequent operation of the Electronic Transactions Bill B2 – 
2019 which was passed in 2019 but awaits an effective date. 
34 Government Gazette No. 7109. 
35 Paragraph 1 of the Bank of Namibia Bill.  
36 Bank of Namibia Bill supra. 
37 Section 3(a) of the Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority Act 3 of 2001, as amended. 
38 See also Harvey op cit note 22.  
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(c) Relevance of Study 
As Namibia is an upper-middle-income country,39 and its economy is still in recession since 
June 2016.40 Coupled further with the fact that a considerable amount of money was lost 
recently in the misappropriation of money by a local commercial bank,41 it is reasonable to 
conclude that Namibia does not have a surplus of foreign reserves to shield its economy from 
large unregulated outflows of money. Equally so, Namibia’s modest economy cannot afford to 
compromise the integrity of its financial industry.  
This dissertation argues that cross-border cryptocurrencies have the ability to evade 
Namibia’s laws and may in theory deplete Namibia’s foreign reserves and compromise the 
integrity of its financial industry.  To ensure Namibia remains solvent it is pertinent to have 
appropriate regulation to mitigate the risks associated with cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions and further discourage their use for illegal purposes in Namibia.  
(d) Research Methodology   
This dissertation was conducted as a desktop-research which evaluated and relied on purely 
textual data in the form of legislation, regulations, Bills, online resources, newspapers, 
textbooks, journals, case law, white papers, green papers and policy documents. Therefore, it 
amounts to a doctrinal analysis which included elements of comparative analysis and policy 
considerations.  
(e) Research Limitations 
Given the ever-evolving nature of the law, and even more so that of technology, this 
dissertation is limited to the present state of law and technology at the time of writing it in June 
2019 until January 2020. Accordingly, this dissertation does not discuss the pending changes 
to the Bank of Namibia Act (the gazetted Bank of Namibia ‘Bill’) that has not yet commenced.  
Moreover, this dissertation is limited to cryptocurrency regulation in the geographical 
territory of Namibia, unless the context indicates the contrary. Although this dissertation 
includes an element of financial regulation, while important, the tax implications of cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions fall outside the ambits of this dissertation.   
 
39 The World Bank Website ‘Namibia at a glance’ available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/namibia/overview accessed on 21 June 2019. 
40 Bank of Namibia website ‘Namibia Financial Stability Report Bank of Namibia and NAMIFISA’ (April 2019) 
16 available at https://www.bon.com.na/Bank/Financial-Stability/Financial-Stability-Reports.aspx accessed on 
21 June 2019. 
41 See Bank of Namibia v Small & Medium Enterprises Bank Ltd and Others (3) 2018 1 NR 193 (HC). 
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(f) Structure of Dissertation   
Chapter one is an introductory chapter. Thereafter, chapter two evaluates from a policy 
perspective why Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Namibia should favourably consider 
regulating cryptocurrencies. This is done by evaluating the current economic stance of Sub-
Saharan Africa and proposing methods in which the digital environment and its technologies, 
distinctly cryptocurrencies can remedy such stance by providing opportunities for sustainable 
economic development and lowering the entry level for financial inclusion in remote parts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter three conducts a comparative analysis between the centralised model of cross-
border financial regulation in Namibia versus the self-regulatory, decentralised cryptocurrency 
network. This is done in order to assess whether the current legislation is able to regulate 
cryptocurrencies or if amendments are required. Chapter four evaluates the rationale for the 
implementation of AML/CFT laws as well as capital and exchange controls. Then it turns to a 
comparative analysis on selected countries namely, South Africa, Rwanda, South Korea, New 
York in the United States of America, and the European Union to examine how they regulate, 
if at all, cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. The comparative analysis informs the 
discussion of Namibia’s regulatory framework for cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. 
Chapter five proposes a multitiered regulatory framework to ensure harmonisation 
amongst jurisdictions by means of a model law. The chapter then details the essential 
provisions Namibia’s cross-border cryptocurrency regulation should contain to ensure the 
integrity of its financial industry and the preservation of its foreign reserves. Chapter six 
proposes recommendations for the realisation of the proposed regulation of cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions in Namibia based on the discussion from the previous chapters. 




II. CHAPTER 2: A POLICY DISCUSSION ON THE REGULATION OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
In a bid for the law to remain relevant, due consideration should be given to public policy, 
because a stagnant legal system could inevitably lose its efficacy. This chapter evaluates the 
rationale behind regulating cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. Due to the novelty and 
intricacies of these transactions this evaluation will be done from a legal policy perspective as 
opposed to a black letter law analysis.  
A brief analysis will be done on the current economic stance of Sub-Saharan Africa,1 as 
consideration for the economy is pivotal in a policy discussion that seeks to build on such 
economy with the aid of the digital environment and its ensuing technologies. Thereafter, a 
comparison will be done to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of utilising the digital 
environment particularly cryptocurrencies to propel Sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter will also 
investigate the current shortcomings of exploiting the full potential of the digital environment 
and advocates for Namibia to regulate cross-border cryptocurrency transactions.  
a) Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economy  
The region is of rich cultural diversity and has vast natural resources, however, it is also riddled 
with poverty, political unrest, lack of infrastructure, natural disasters, unemployment, and 
debilitating sovereign debt, to mention but a few of the socio-economic shortcomings. These 
conditions are amongst the reasons for the region’s full potential being unrealised. Despite the 
declining economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa of 2.5 per cent and 2.3 per cent in 
2017 and 2018,2 respectively. The population in the region has nevertheless increased.3 This 
adds further strain to the struggling economy. The declining economic growth is attributed to 
various reasons. Such as the low oil exports from Angola and Nigeria which are caused by the 
instability of the international oil sector,4 and the intermittent withdrawal of international 
investments from South Africa5 on account of a lack of business confidence.6   
 
1 Interchangeably referred to as the ‘region’. As this dissertation seeks to provide Namibia’s regulatory framework 
for cross-border cryptocurrency transactions, this chapter will narrow its focus to Namibia, while having due 
regard for the region within which it is located. 
2 World Bank Group ‘An Analysis of Issues Shaping Africa’s Economic Future’ (April 2019) 19 Africa’s Pulse 
1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 19. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
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While natural disasters in countries such as Mozambique7 and Namibia8 are equally as taxing 
on the underperforming economy.  
The trade-related conflicts between powerhouse economies,9 such as the United States 
of America (USA) and China further hinders trade with Sub-Saharan Africa10 which is caught 
in the middle of this power struggle. It therefore comes as no surprise that more than 40 per 
cent of the region’s population lived in life-threatening poverty in 2015.11 Although recent 
predictions show mild improvements in parts of the region12 there is still cause for concern. As 
the overall estimated growth for the region is underwhelming at 2.8 per cent and 3.3 per cent 
for 2019 and 2020,13 respectively. With the present underperforming economy, Sub-Saharan 
Africa would most likely still be plagued with life-threatening poverty until 2030.14 In order to 
resuscitate this underperforming economy, it would require collaboration within the region15 
with multidimensional policy reforms16 to enhance its resilience.17 Such policy reforms include 
capitalising on the digital environment.18  
 
7 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 11. Jeff Wicks ‘Nearly 500 Dead in Mozambique in Wake of Cyclone Idai’  
Sunday Times 25 March 2019 - 16:24 available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/africa/2019-03-25-nearly-
500-dead-in-mozambique-in-wake-of-cyclone-idai/ accessed on 20 June 2019.  
8 Recent droughts in Namibia resulted in its President declaring a state of emergency. See Government Gazette 
No. 14 Declaration of State of Emergency: National Disaster (Drought): Namibian Constitution 6 May 2019. 
9 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 21. 
10 Ibid.  
11 United Nations The Millennium Development Goals Report (2015) 15. 
12 See Prinesha Naidoo ‘IMF Sees Namibia Growing in 2020 After Three-Year Contraction’ (13 September 2019) 
Bloomberg available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-13/imf-sees-namibia-growing-in-
2020-after-three-year-contraction accessed on 29 January 2020. 
13 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 19. 
14 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 24. While countries such as Namibia had envisioned to economically stable 
by 2030, see Government of the Republic of Namibia (Namibia Vision 2030 Policy) Framework for Long-Term 
National Development (2004) 38. 
15 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 57. 
16 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 24.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
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b) Advantages of utilising the Digital Environment     
The digital environment has vast potential,19 if cultivated correctly it can stimulate economic 
growth in the region.20 Its technologies provide a more efficient manner of transacting21 and 
progressively reduces the costs associated with such transactions.22 Therefore, digital 
technologies ensure that the financial industry remains competitive23 and ever evolving with 
customers’ needs. These needs can include providing swift credit facilities to small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa who are unable to meet their credit needs.24 
 This is particularly relevant because efforts to enhance financial inclusion in the region 
still warrant further attention as attempts to lower the entry level to the banking sector25 have 
not yielded the returns hoped for. Estimations hold that out of 590 million adults in the region,26 
350 million are unbanked.27 One of the main reasons for this is that it is economically 
unfeasible to erect a physical bank in a desolated area of the region.28 Which leaves a large 
portion of the population unaccounted for in the conventional banking sector, as statistically 
82 per cent of the population still lives in rural areas.29  
In recent years more than half of the world's mobile telephone banking was conducted in 
the region.30 The use of digital technologies has increased the number of bank accounts within  
 
19 In countries such as Rwanda and Kenya blockchain technology are being used to digitise land registration, see 
Kevin Mwanza ‘Kenyan Lawyers Wrangle with Government over Land Registry Digitization’ Jared Ferrie (ed) 
Thomson Reuters Foundation (7 May 2018) available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-landrights-
idUSKBN1I81K1, accessed on 14 August 2019. While Namibia has largely streamlined and digitised its litigation 





pdf&usg=AOvVaw04lRgrTgJi2Rzz4ok74Eik, accessed on 14 August 2019. 
20 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 3. 
21 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 72. 
22 Vera Songwe ‘A Digital Africa’ (June 2019) vol. 56 no. 2 Finance & Development 29. 
23 Sephooko I. Motelle ‘The Race of Innovation in Financial Services and the Regulatory Chase: Some Thoughts 
on the Regulation of Crypto-Currencies’ (2017) vol. 3 no. 4 Development Finance Agenda 8. 
24 European Investment Bank ‘Digital Financial Inclusion in sub-Saharan Africa’ Africa Conference Paper, Day 
6 (July 2017) at 5. Digital technologies also allow SMEs to engage in trade on a global platform and obtain 
exposure from such platform, Department of Communications A Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South 
Africa (2000) 15. 
25 Bank of Namibia ‘Introducing the Basic Bank Account’ available at https://www.bon.com.na/Education/Basic-
Bank-Account-Brochure.aspx accessed on 14 August 2019. 
26 European Investment Bank op cit note 24 at 2. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 81.  
30 European Investment Bank op cit note 24 at 3 and Moses Mozart Dzawu ‘Sub-Saharan Africa has more Mobile-
Money Accounts than anywhere else in the World’ (13 August 2019) Monwyweb para 7 available at 




the region by 10 per cent from 2011 to 2014.31 The solution to financial inclusion in the region 
may in part be the accessibility of such services by means of digital technologies.32 Capitalising 
on such technologies can afford low-income countries access to digital financial inclusion at a 
minimal cost.33 Amongst these novel digital technologies is the use of cryptocurrencies as a 
method of payment. Cryptocurrencies can even the playing fields in the region by offering 
world-class financial services34 swiftly35 and at a fraction of the cost.36 
In addition, the self-regulating blockchain technology of cryptocurrencies offer 
cryptocurrency users (users) financial services that are relatively free from theft and 
manipulation.37  This striking feature is particularly attractive in a region that is susceptible to 
corruption. Another attraction of cryptocurrencies is that they are relatively immune to political 
and economic instability.38  
c) Disadvantages of utilising the Digital Environment   
Amidst the potential advantages the digital environment offers they are nevertheless plagued 
with imminent risks, especially in the absence of regulatory supervision. In an attempt to shelter 
customers many central banks have issued warning statements discouraging the use of 
 
31 European Investment Bank op cit note 24 at 3. 
32 TymeBank, South Africa’s first entirely digital bank has noticed this gap and seeks to reach the under-serviced 
market, see TymeBank’s Website available at https://www.tymebank.co.za/# accessed on 12 August 2019. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Department of Communications op cit note 24 at 15.  
35 Ireland’s Department of Finance ‘Discussion Paper: Virtual Currencies and Blockchain Technology’ (March 
2018) at 22. As such academics have advocated for a global settlement system underpinned by blockchain 
technology, see Claire Schupmann ‘Blockchain as an Emerging Cross-Border Payments Infrastructure’ (2017) 
Emerging Scholars Paper 28 Institute of International Law and Justice at 5. At a sub-regional level, the use of 
cryptocurrencies within an appropriate regulatory framework can expedite the cross-border settlements of the 
SADC Real-Time Gross Settlement System, see Bank of Namibia Annual Report (2018) 36. The efficiency offered 
by cross-border cryptocurrency transactions may also enhance commercial transactions within the continent, as 
an aid to the objectives of the African Union, detailed in its African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement in 
terms of Article 6.  
36 Schupmann op cit note 35 at 6. The high costs associated with conventional banking have in recent times been 
subjected to scrutiny, see Hilton Tarrant ‘Discovery Bank’s Complex Pricing’ (13 August 2019) available at 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-opinion/columnists/discovery-banks-complex-pricing/, accessed on 14 
August 2019. Another cost saving factor of cryptocurrencies is that they do not require the production costs of 
minting and printing unlike fiat money, see Steven Levy ‘E-Money (That's What I Want)’ Wired (1994) para 9 
available at https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ accessed on 22 June 2019.  
37 Ireland’s Department of Finance op cit note 35 at 22. Arvind Narayanan et al Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency 
Technologies: A Comprehensive Introduction (2016) at 2 and 34. Jerry Brito and Andrea Castillo ‘Bitcoin: A 
Primer for Policymakers’ (2013-2014) vol. 29 no. 4 Policy 4. Andrea O'Sullivan ‘Ungoverned or Anti-
Governance? How Bitcoin Threatens the Future of Western Institutions’ (2018) vol. 71 no. 2 Journal of 
International Affairs 90. 
38 Staff Writer ‘The Rand Is Now the Worst-Performing Currency in the World: Analyst’ (12 August 2019) 
BusinessTech https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/334137/the-rand-is-now-the-worst-performing-currency-
in-the-world-analyst/ accessed on 14 August 2019. 
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cryptocurrencies.39 The self-regulating blockchain technology that underpins cryptocurrencies 
hinders their co-existence with the conventional banking sector.40 Coupled with the fact that 
users have the ability to transact on an international scale pseudonymously, void of any 
regulatory constrains is extremely appealing to users who seek to use cryptocurrencies for illicit 
transactions.41 Similar concerns about the lack of regulatory supervision were raised by the 
USA House Committee on Financial Services about the proposed cryptocurrency of the Libra 
Association which is not subjected to any effective regulatory supervision.42 Particularly 
because it is in part a Facebook initiative43 and Facebook has in the past raised serious concerns 
about the violation of customer’s rights amongst other concerns.44  
Cross-border cryptocurrency transactions have also attracted the attention of the G20 
who now seek to gain an understanding of the technical workings of cryptocurrencies and their 
implications to ‘monetary sovereignty’.45 In 2011 the World Bank flagged Namibia’s  
 
39 Bank of Namibia ‘Bank of Namibia Revised Position on Cryptocurrencies’ (May 2018) para 3.1 available at 
https://www.bon.com.na/.../Bon/.../9ab34d1a-07d7-45b3-859a-6e51814d690b.pdf accessed on 21 June 2019, and 
Central Bank of Kenya ‘Banking Circular No 14 of 2015 (Virtual Currencies – Bitcoin)’ paras 1 - 2 available at 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/policy-procedures/legislation-and-guidelines/circulars/ accessed on 14 August 
2019. See also European Banking Authority (EBA) ‘Opinion on Virtual Currencies’ EBA/Op/2014/08 (4 July 
2014) 23 available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/.../EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf 
accessed on 22 June 2019. South African Reserve Bank Website Virtual Currencies/ Crypto-currencies available 
athttps://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/FinancialSurveillanceAndExchangeControl/FAQs/Pag
es/VirtualCurrenciesCryptocurrencies.aspx accessed on 20 September 2019. Central Bank of Kenya ‘Banking 
Circular No 14 of 2015 (Virtual Currencies – Bitcoin)’ paras 1 - 2 available at 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/policy-procedures/legislation-and-guidelines/circulars/ accessed on 14 August 
2019. Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe ‘Circular to Banking Institutions NO. 2/2018: Virtual Currencies - 15 May 
2018’ para 5(a)-(b) available at https://www.rbz.co.zw/index.php/regulation-supervision/regulation-
supervision/guidelines-circulars-and-public-notices-3/499-circular-to-banking-institutions-no-2-2018-virtual-
currencies accessed on 20 September 2019. 
40 Hossein Nabilou ‘How to Regulate Bitcoin? Decentralized Regulation for a Decentralized Cryptocurrency’ 
(2019) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 9. 
41 The Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 (5 th AML 
Directive) paras 2 and 4. Financial Action Task Force (FATF) ‘Report to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors’ (July 2018) para 9 available at www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/fatf-g20-
april-2019.html accessed on 21 June 2019. See United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in United States 
of America, Appellee, V. Ross William Ulbricht, A/K/A Dread Pirate Roberts, A/K/A Silk Road, A/K/A Sealed 
Defendant 1, A/K/A Defendant-Appellant 1. Reuters and Rob Price ‘Authorities in US indicts alleged Russian 
money-laundering 'mastermind' Business Insider behind $4 billion bitcoin exchange’ 26 July 2017 available at 
https://www.businessinsider.com/us-indicts-alexander-vinnik-alleged-operator-btc-e-money-laundering-2017-
7?IR=T accessed on 22 June 2019. 
42 U.S House Committee on Financial Services ‘Examining Facebook’s Proposed Cryptocurrency and Its Impact 
on Consumers, Investors, and the American Financial System’ (17 July 2019) Webcast of the Hearing available 
at https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=404001 accessed on 12 August 2019. 
43 The Libra Association Members An Introduction to Libra: White Paper (23 July 2019) 4. 
44 U.S House Committee on Financial Services ‘An Examination of Facebook and Its Impact on the Financial 
Services and Housing Sectors’ (23 October 2019) Webcast of the Hearing available at 
https://financialservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=404487 accessed on 25 October 2019. 
45 G20 Press Release on Global Stablecoins (18 October 2019) Washington DC available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-finance-stablecoins.html accessed on 28 January 2020.  The Financial 
Stability Board will be assisting the G20 by investigating cryptocurrencies and thereafter reporting their findings 
to the G20 in April 2020. The report will include, whether the current regulatory framework effectively addresses 
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susceptibility to illicit money because it is geographically bordered by two corrupt countries,46 
namely South Africa and Angola.47 These concerns have only been exacerbated by 
pseudonymous cross-border cryptocurrency transactions that lack accountability because they 
are not regulated. In the absence of regulation, users are exposed to cybersecurity risks,48 
consumer protection uncertainties,49 and volatile cryptocurrency investments.50  
Cryptocurrencies have also been criticised as having nothing to do with the unbanked at 
the current rate they are trading.51 The overall digital environment may be out of reach for many 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,52 including Namibia. In 2016, the World Bank recorded that 
52.38 per cent of Namibia's population still lives in rural areas.53  
These areas often have limited or no internet coverage and no devices compatible with 
cryptocurrency transactions. Even if they did, it is highly unlikely that the population in those 
areas would know how to use those devices to transact with cryptocurrencies.54 A discussion 
on the disadvantages of digital technologies and their environment cannot be concluded 
without mentioning the possibility that such technologies may result in certain jobs becoming  
 
the concerns surrounding cryptocurrencies, particularly cross-border concerns. And further advising the G20 on 
whether additional regulation is required to adequately address concerns relating to global financial stability and 
systemic risk, see Financial Stability Board G20 Regulatory issues of stablecoins (18 October 2019).  
46 Stuart Yikona, et al ‘Ill-gotten Money and the Economy: Experiences from Malawi and Namibia / Financial 
Market Integrity’ (2011) Finance and Private Sector Development The World Bank 61 and 71. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See Riaan Grobler ‘City of Joburg shuts down all Systems after Cyber attack demanding Bitcoin Ransom’ (25 
October 2019) News24 available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/city-of-joburg-shuts-down-all-
systems-after-cyber-attack-demanding-bitcoin-ransom-20191025 accessed on 26 October 2019. It is for this 
reason that the African Union stresses the importance of cybersecurity in its Convention on Cyber Security and 
Personal Data Protection, however national regulation in this regard lags behind. For instance, the Central Bank 
of Kenya has issued mere guidelines to its financial industry to be mindful of cyber risks and mitigate against 
cyber breaches see, Central Bank of Kenya ‘Guidance Note on CyberSecurity’ (2017) para 2.1 available at 
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/policy-procedures/legislation-and-guidelines/circulars/ accessed on 14 August 
2019. While other central banks seem to have failed to recognise the risk associated with the digital environment. 
49 See Lisa Kramer ‘Regulations Needed after Cryptocurrency CEO Takes Passwords to His Grave’ (4 April 2019) 
Marketplace Global Game-Changers at 21 available at http://theconversation.com/regulations-needed-after-
cryptocurrency-ceo-takes-passwords-to-his-grave-112759 accessed on 21 June 2019. Emily Crane ‘Regulation 
Without Deflation: Cryptocurrency and its Insider Trading Conundrum’ (2018) vol. 51 The John Marshall Law 
Review 798. 
50 Brito and Castillo op cit note 37 at 3.  
51 Asress Adimi Gikay ‘Regulating Decentralized Cryptocurrencies Under Payment Services Law: Lessons from 
European Union Law’ (2018) vol. 9 Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet 3. 
52 Even though the United Nations has recognised the right to access the internet in Article 19(b) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See Frank La Rue 
‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression’ United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council (16 May 2011) Seventeenth Session 
Agenda Item 3 A/HRC/17/27 at 7. Nevertheless, this right is out of reach for majority of the region, as in 2018 
only 27 per cent of the region had access to the internet, see World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 81. 
53 Trading Economics ‘Namibia - Rural Population’ available at https://tradingeconomics.com/namibia/rural-
population-percent-of-total-population-wb-data.html accessed on 23 June 2019. 
54 Gikay op cit note 51 at 3. 
17 
 
redundant. This is a concern in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the population lacks 
the technical skills to occupy new jobs created by digital technologies.55  
d) Shortcomings in exploiting the Full Potential of the Digital Environment  
If cultivated properly by regulation the potential benefits of the digital environment and its 
technologies, including cryptocurrencies, can pave the way for sustainable socioeconomic 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa.56 Which arguably outweighs the associated risks. 
Therefore, it is imperative that the region provides an appropriate policy response57 which 
strives to encourage innovation while remaining mindful of the ever-present risks.58 A policy 
position which seeks to ban or simply ignore digital technologies such as cryptocurrencies, 
may inevitably increase the digital divide.59 And may be rendered ineffective, when faced with 
‘regulatory arbitrage’60 as these transactions are facilitated with the aid of the internet making 
them accessible from virtually anywhere in the world.61 Attempts to ban cryptocurrencies may 
arguably result in users transacting on illegal platforms62 or using a more favourable country 
to facilitate their cryptocurrency transactions.63  
It is for this reason that this dissertation advocates for regulatory reforms that harness the 
full potential of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions, while remedying or at the very least 
mitigating the associated risks. This dissertation argues that the greatest stumbling block to 
exploiting the full potential that cryptocurrencies offer, is the lack of regulation.64 Because of  
 
55 Sarah Harford ‘Digitalisation Could Lead to Nearly 50,000 Job Losses: Here is Why the Government Isn't 
Worried’ FORA (11 December 2018) available at https://fora.ie/digital-transformation-ireland-4385694-
Dec2018/ accessed on 21 June 2019. The ripple effects of digitisation is already noticeable in the financial 
industry, Tjipenandjambi Kuhanga ‘Banking sector to shed 1 800 jobs’ The Namibian 19 February 2019, reported 
that the banking sector intends to retrench redundant employees as their services have been replaced by internet 
banking, available at https://www.namibian.com.na/185946/archive-read/Banking-sector-to-shed-1-800-job 
accessed on 18 September 2019. 
56 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 81. 
57 World Economic Forum The Global Risks Report 11 ed. (2016) 42 and Ibid. G20 Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion Digital Financial Inclusion: Emerging Policy Approaches (July 2017) 15. 
58 G20 op cit note 57 at 11. 
59 G20 op cit note 57 at 4. 
60 Victor Fleischer ‘Regulatory Arbitrage’ (4 March 2010) SSRN 3. ‘Regulatory arbitrage' can be understood as 
the exploitation of a more favourable regulatory environment when there are discrepancies between two regulatory 
environments, as such the gap between the two is exploited.  
61 Nabilou op cit note 40 at 10. 
62 Nabilou op cit note 40 at 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64 The banking sector, for example, has distanced themselves from cryptocurrencies amidst the uncertainty of the 
risks and their associated obligations, see Jamie McKane ‘FNB shuts down South African cryptocurrency-linked 
bank accounts’ (19 November 2019) MyBroadband available at 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cryptocurrency/328355-fnb-shuts-down-south-african-cryptocurrency-linked-
bank-accounts.html accessed on 24 November 2019. Percival Soko ‘One of “Big Five” Banks in South Africa is 
Withdrawing its Services to Crypto Exchanges’ (22 November 2019) Tech Financials available at 
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the borderless nature of the digital environment,65 including cryptocurrencies, it is for the 
benefit of all countries that their policy responses be harmonious.66  
Once regulated, infrastructural needs must be addressed67 which includes access to the 
internet,68 at a competitive price,69 and a stable source of electricity.70 Capacity building is also 
required by the upscaling of skills.71 As such increasing digital literacy72 and financial literacy73 
in the region. This is necessary to ensure that regulators are competent to effectively regulate 
cryptocurrencies, and further to address users’ ‘technophobia’74 in the region.  
In striking an appropriate balance between fostering innovation and risk mitigation, this 
dissertation argues that cross-border cryptocurrency transactions can be regulated, even if this 
is only done in part at this stage. As such, Namibia’s regulatory framework for cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions should include the following essential provisions: (1) a licensing 
procedure75 for service providers which also subjects users to regulation,76 for both commercial 
and non-commercial cryptocurrency transactions. (2) Regulatory supervision77 that removes 
pseudonyms, and subjects service providers and users to effective supervision.78 (3) The 
implementation of preventative measures such as reporting obligations on service providers 
and customer due diligence.79   
 
https://techfinancials.co.za/2019/11/22/one-of-big-five-banks-in-south-africa-is-withdrawing-its-services-to-
crypto-exchanges/ accessed on 24 November 2019. 
65 Songwe op cit note 22 at 29.  
66 Ibid. Harmonisation in the digital sphere is vital because, ‘new technologies such as the internet have effectively 
eliminated national borders on the information highway and these poses inherent problems of jurisdiction and 
enforcement’, see Department of Communications op cit note 24 at 12. In Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife 2008 
JOL 22096 (LC) a South African labour court reiterated the same sentiments stating that digital transactions are 
borderless and therefore require harmonisation for effective regulation, paras 56-7. 
67 Department of Communications op cit note 24 at.4 and World Economic Forum op cit note 57 at 42. 
68 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 3. 
69 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 49. 
70 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 52. 
71 World Bank Group op cit note 2 at 3 and World Economic Forum op cit note 57 at 42. 
72 Western Sydney University states that ‘digital literacy’ can be understood as the ability to navigate and use 
various digital technologies available at 
https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/studysmart/home/digital_literacy/what_is_digital_literacy accessed on 10 
August 2019. See also Antonio Calvani et al ‘Models and Instruments for assessing Digital Competence at School’ 
(September 2008) vol. 4 Journal of e-Learning and Knowledge Society 185.  
73 G20 op cit note 57 at 4. 
74 MC Clarke ‘Technological Experience and Technophobia in South African University Students’ (August 2000) 
no. 25 South Africa Computer Journal 14. 
75 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers (June 2019) (FATF Guidance) para 6. 
76 FATF Guidance op cit note 75 para 8. 
77 FATF Guidance op cit note 75 para 6. 




(4) Ensuring that all cryptocurrency transactions are subjected to the law. Which will in turn 
ensure that the regulation of cross-border cryptocurrencies is ‘technologically neutral’80 by 
subjecting them to the same legal requirements as those of conventional cross-border 
transactions. (5) Addressing jurisdictional concerns for cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions that involved Namibia. 
In summary, digital technologies like cryptocurrencies offer Sub-Saharan countries such 
as Namibia the ability to propel its economy, if cultivated properly. For that reason, this 
dissertation advocates for the regulation of cross-border cryptocurrencies transactions as they 
have the potential to lower the entry level of financial inclusion and with the appropriate 
regulation associated risks can be remedied or mitigated, for the most part. Against this 
backdrop chapter three will evaluate how the traditional centralised model regulates 
conventional cross-border transactions, in comparison to how the self-regulatory 
cryptocurrency network facilitates cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. This will be done 
in order to determine whether current regulation can address the concerns raised by cross-
border cryptocurrencies or if amendments to the law is required for effective regulation. 
 
 
80 Rajab Ali ‘Technological Neutrality’ (2009) 14(2) Lex Electronic 2. ‘Technology neutrality’ can be understood 
as a non-discriminatory interpretive provision that ensures that digital technologies are placed on equal footing as 
their paper-based counterpart. Moreover, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law's 
Convention on The Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, states that the same set of laws 
should apply to digital technologies as with their paper-based counterpart, regardless of the format or technology 
used for such digital transactions (2007) Preamble para 5. 
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III. CHAPTER 3: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRALISED 
MODEL OF CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL REGULATION VERSUS THE 
SELF-REGULATORY CRYPTOCURRENCY NETWORK  
In order to provide an appropriate regulation for cross-border cryptocurrency transactions 
which seeks to ensure that such transactions are executed in conformity with Namibia’s 
AML/CFT laws and capital and exchange controls, it is important to conduct an evaluation of 
the current regulation of cross-border transactions. This evaluation is essential in order to 
determine whether current regulation can appropriately address the concerns raised by cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions or if there is a need for amendments to the law. 
This exercise will require a comparative analysis of the theoretical differences between 
the centralised regulatory model of cross-border transactions compared to the self-regulating 
cryptocurrency network. By further drawing from the current cross-border regulations of the 
Bank and the Centre. This will be compared to the operations of Bitcoin, as an example of a 
cryptocurrency and its self-regulatory cryptographic technology. The use of technical 
terminology will be limited to the degree required for the purpose of this dissertation.1  
a) The Centralised Regulatory Model 
(i) Capital and Exchange Controls 
In Namibia, the movement of money and the acquisition of foreign money is heavily regulated 
with the imposition of capital and exchange controls. These controls are implemented when 
natural and juristic persons wish to engage in a financial transaction outside of the CMA.2 The 
regulation of cross-border transactions is entrusted to the Ministry of Finance as ‘Treasury’3 
who has appointed the Bank as its agent to administer such regulations on its behalf.4  
The Bank has in turn licensed authorised dealers (ADs)5 to assist in the administration of 
the Exchange Control Regulations. Along with foreign exchange bureaus,6 who are known as  
 
1 Hossein Nabilou ‘How to Regulate Bitcoin? Decentralized Regulation for a Decentralized Cryptocurrency’ 
(2019) International Journal of Law and Information Technology 2. 
2 Bank of Namibia Manual for Individuals’ (28 September 2018) Version number 1.0 Circular number 01//2018 
(Manual for Individuals) 31. Bank of Namibia ‘Currency and Exchanges Manual for Businesses’ (18 September 
2018) Version number 1.0 Circular number 01//2018 (Manual for Businesses) 13. 
3 In terms of s 1 Exchange Control Regulations. 
4 In terms of s 46 of the Bank of Namibia Act, read in conjunction with the Currency and Exchanges Act and 
Regulation 22E of the Exchange Control Regulations. Bank of Namibia Annual Report (2018) 42. 
5 Regulation 2 (1) of the Exchange Control Regulations. Manual for Individuals’ op cit note 2 at 4, Manual for 
Businesses op cit note 2 at 8.  
6 Manual for Individuals op cit note 2 at 4. 
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authorised dealers with limited authority (ADLAs).7 Having granted such authorisation to ADs 
and ADLAs the Bank supervises their operations to ensure compliance with the Exchange 
Control Regulations.8  
The fundamental premise of the Exchange Control Regulations is that cross-border 
transactions require prior approval9 or exemption10 from the Bank. For instance, the acquisition 
and disposal of foreign money is restricted to such approval.11 The production of a positive 
identification document is one of the prerequisites to obtaining the approval.12 The identity of 
a natural or juristic person is paramount for ensuring accountability for the enforcement of the 
Exchange Control Regulations and other laws in general.  
Foreign money obtained through the Exchange Control Regulations may only be used 
for the purposes for which such approval was sought.13 Therefore, any surplus thereof must be 
resold to an AD within the prescribed period.14 In terms of its delegated authority the  Bank 
also has the power to monitor and regulate foreign assets that Namibian residents have claim 
to.15 In addition, persons departing from Namibia are required upon request of an officer,16 to 
disclose whether they have local or foreign money in their possession17 and produce supporting 
documents.18 The same applies to persons entering Namibia.19  
Notably, South Africa and Namibia have the same Exchange Control Regulations and 
Exchange Control Act.20 Therefore, their regulation of capital and exchange controls are for 
the most part identical.21 Interestingly, the South African Constitutional Court in South African  
 
7 Manual for Individuals op cit note 2 at 4 and 9. Manual for Businesses op cit note 2 at 8 and 13. 
8 In terms of Regulation 19(1)-(2) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
9 For instances, Regulation 10(1)(c) places limitation on taking money outside of Namibia without such authority. 
Similar provision are included in Regulations 2(1), 3(1), 4(4)(b) and (d), 4(7), 6(5), 6(6), 7(2), 8(1), 9(1), 11(1), 
12(4), 13(1), 14(1), (4)- (5), 15(4)-(5), 16(1) and (5)-(6), 22A(1)(b)-(c), 22C(2) and 23(2) of the Exchange Control 
Regulations. 
10 In terms of Regulations 3(1), 3(3)(b)(i), 3(6)(b)(i), 4(8), 5(2)(a), 6(7) and (10)(a), 7(3), 15(6)(a)-(b), 16(2)(a)-
(b) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
11 In terms of Regulation 2(1), Regulation 2(2)(a), Regulation 2(3), Regulation 2(4)(a) and Regulation 5 of the 
Exchange Control Regulations. 
12 Manual for Individuals op cit note 2 at 10-13 and 20. Manual for Businesses op cit note 2 at 32 and 61. 
13 In terms of Regulation 2(4) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
14 In terms of Regulation 2(5) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
15 In terms of Regulation 7(1) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
16 In terms of Regulation 3(3) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
17 In terms of Regulation 3(3) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
18 In terms of Regulation 3(6)(b)(i)-(ii) of the Exchange Control Regulations. 
19 In terms of Regulation 3(6) of the Exchange Control Regulations. Similarly, s 36 of the Financial Intelligence 
Act also requires disclosures of cash exceeding a determined threshold, for persons entering and exiting Namibia. 
20 Article 140 of the Constitution validates laws that were in force before Namibia gained its independence, unless 
later repealed. 
21 The Exchange Control Regulations in the CMA are for the most part identical.  
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Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another22 declared s 923 of the Exchange Control 
Act constitutionally invalid.24 This judgment was based on the premise that the President, as 
‘Governor-General’25 does not  have original legislative powers.26 More so, the Ministry of 
Finance and the South African Reserve Bank performing some of the ‘Governor-General[’s]’27 
duties in terms of s 9 of the Exchange Control Act is likewise invalid,28 as s 9(1) of the said 
Act does not provide for sub-delegation.29 In order for Namibia to shield itself from the same 
constitutional challenges faced in Shuttleworth it is advisable for the National Assembly to 
rather pass the Exchange Control Regulations.  
(ii) Anti-money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism Financing  
Ensuring compliance with Namibia’s AML/CFT laws is simply too voluminous for the Centre 
alone, therefore certain preventative measures30 and reporting obligations31 are placed on 
‘accountable institutions’32 to assist with this task in the operations of their businesses. ADs 
and ADLAs are also classified as accountable institutions.33  
Section 34 of the Financial Intelligence Act extends these legal obligations to electronic 
cross-border transactions.34 Although the Centre sought to extend its regulatory scope to the 
digital environment by regulating ‘electronic money’,35 the Financial Intelligence Act and its 
subsequent Regulations fail to define the term electronic money.36 
 
22 South African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another 2015 (8) BCLR 959 (CC) (Shuttleworth). 
23 As stated above the Exchange Control Regulations issued by the President under s 9 of the Exchange Control 
Act. 
24 Shuttleworth supra at para 124. 
25 In terms of s 9 of the Exchange Control Act. 
26 Shuttleworth supra at para 84. These powers are reserved for the National Assembly in Namibia in terms of 
Article 44 of the Constitution, while the President assents to legislation and exercises the other functions entrusted 
to that office in terms of Article 32 of the Constitution.  
27 Section 9 of the Exchange Control Act. 
28 Shuttleworth supra at paras117 and 120. 
29 Shuttleworth supra paras117 and 120. 
30 In terms of s 24 (1) of the Financial Intelligence Act. Section 1 of the Financial Intelligence Act define ‘customer 
due diligence’ to mean ‘a process which involves establishing the identity of a client, the identity of the client’s 
beneficial owners in respect of legal persons and monitoring all transactions of the client against the client’s 
profile’. 
31 In terms of s 32(1) of the Financial Intelligence Act. 
32 In terms of s 2 and 39 of the Financial Intelligence Act. 
33 In terms of Schedule 1 of the Financial Intelligence Act para 4 for ADs and para 8 for ADLAs. 
34 Section 43 of the Financial Intelligence Act. 
35 Regulation 32(2) of the Financial Intelligence Regulations Government Notice 3 of 2015 made under the 
Financial Intelligence Act.  
36 In terms of s 1 of the Financial Intelligence Act the terms ‘cash’ is defined primarily as domestic and foreign 
notes and coins. However, ‘money’ is not defined. 
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Thus causing Regulation 32(2) that requires full disclosure in cross-border transactions from 
the sending and receiving country37 vague and susceptible to judicial criticism.  
In summary, the efficiency of both the Exchange Control Regulations and the Financial 
Intelligence Act is based on the fact that conventional cross-border transactions were within 
reach of these laws and consequently allow for robust regulation by the licensing of ADs and 
ADLAs which subjects them to certain legal obligations. This in turn ensures that the Bank and 
the Centre are able to supervise their operations and have the authority to enforce their 
regulations by, for instance blocking bank accounts,38 seizing and forfeiting money to the 
government.39 As a result, the Bank and the Centre can effectively enforce their regulations, as 
failure to comply with the Exchange Control Regulations and Financial Intelligence Act may 
attract criminal liability.40  
b) The Cryptocurrency Network 
Financial services were revolutionised, when the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto created 
Bitcoin41 and the network that allows Bitcoins to be issued and traded without the need for an 
intermediary.42 Transacting without an intermediary like the Bank may result in what is known 
as the ‘double spending’43 problem. However, Nakamoto remedied this problem by taking the 
record keeping function from one single intermediary to the masses.44 For example, in rural 
Namibia, if Jack and previously his ancestors owned a farm, the mass community living in that 
area would be aware of the ownership.45 If Randy made claim to the farm, the masses would 
assist Jack in his defence,46 by confirming his ownership of the farm47 without necessarily 
needing the assistance of an intermediary,48 such as the land registrar. The masses who are 
required to keep record in this scenario, can further prevent illicit transactions.49 For instance  
 
37 Regulation 32(2) of the Financial Intelligence Regulations. 
38 In terms of Regulation 4(2) of the Exchange Control Regulations. Section 9(2)(g)-(h) of the Financial 
Intelligence Act. 
39 In terms of Regulation 3(3), 3(7), 22B of the Exchange Control Regulations and s 36(7) of the Financial 
Intelligence Act. 
40 In terms of Regulation 22 of the Exchange Control Regulations and s 63-5 of the Financial Intelligence Act. 
41 Satoshi Nakamoto ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’ (2008) 1. 
42 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 4. 
43 Jerry Brito and Andrea Castillo ‘Bitcoin: A Primer for Policymakers’ (2013-2014) 29 (4) Policy 3. This occurs 
when the same money is sent twice because there is no intermediary validating transactions. Nakamoto op cit note 
41 at 8. 
44 Nick Furneaux, Investigating Cryptocurrencies: Understanding, Extracting, and Analyzing Blockchain 
Evidence (2018) 5. Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 1. 







 where a corrupt Jack attempts to sell the farm to Scott and thereafter tries to resell it to 
Mandy.50 The masses would once again be able to intervene and ensure the integrity of Jack’s 
transactions.  
Although  David Chaum was unsuccessful in providing the first effective cryptocurrency 
in 1985, he too envisioned the need for ‘interlinked computerized record-keeping systems’51 in 
order to do away with intermediaries.52 In the Bitcoin network the record keeping function is 
known as a blockchain53 which is a continually updated transactional ledger.54 That further  
archives and publicly displays55 all validated transactions of the network.56 The community is 
known as nodes,57 which are users that have connected their computers and actively participate 
on the Bitcoin network.58 The mass that keep record are known as miners59 who validate 
transactions and continually update the transactional ledger.60 And the process of validation is 
known as mining.61 
Bitcoin transactions have the ability to operate without any licence as they are purely on 
a consensus basis,62 on a person63 to person network.64 As such, it is ‘permissionless’65 and 
decentralised in nature.66 At present, Bitcoin theoretically operates in Namibia, without  
 
50 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 6. 
51 David Chaum ‘Security without Identification: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete’ (October 
1985) vol. 28 no. 10 Communications of the ACM 1030. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 3. Arvind Narayanan et al Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: A 
Comprehensive Introduction (2016) 11. Furneaux op cit note 44 at 9. 
54 Ibid (Interchangeably referred to as the blockchain). 
55 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 3. Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at11. Furneaux op cit note 44 at 9. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 1-2, Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 29. Furneaux op cit note 44 at 6. Andreas M. 
Antonopoulos Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurrencies 2 ed (2015) 6. 
58 Ibid  
59 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 11. Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 27. 
60 Arvind Narayanan and Jeremy Clark ‘Bitcoin’s Academic Pedigree’ (November 2017) vol. 60 no. 12 
Communications of the ACM 36. Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 3 and 32. Annamart Nieman ‘A Few South 
African Cents' Worth on Bitcoin’ (2015) vol. 18 no. 5 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1986. 
61 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. Nieman op cit note 60 at 1987. 
62 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 8. Nieman op cit note 60 at 1986. 
63 Includes juristic persons. 
64 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 8. Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 27. Antonopoulos op cit note 57, goes on to state 
that because it is a person to person network, there is not one node more superior than another, all nodes on the 
network are on equal footing, at 139.  
65 Hossein Nabilou and André Prüm ‘Ignorance, Debt, and Cryptocurrencies: The Old and the New in the Law 
and Economics of Concurrent Currencies’ (March 2019) vol. 5 no. 1 Journal of Financial Regulation footnote 
158. 
66 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 3. Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 1. Nieman op cit note 60 at 1986. The 
exceptions to these decentralised cryptocurrencies are when central institutions, such as the People’s Republic 
Bank of China or the Republic of Marshall Islands issue their own cryptocurrencies. see, Bloomberg ‘China Is 
Close to Releasing Its Own Cryptocurrency’ para 6 available at 
https://mybroadband.co.za/news/cryptocurrency/316149-china-is-close-to-releasing-its-own-
cryptocurrency.html/amp accessed on 12 August 2019. See also of s 302 of Declaration and Issuance of The 
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regulatory supervision or any form of accountability.67 Their borderless nature also raises 
serious jurisdictional concerns for regulators such as the Bank and the Centre. The next part 
will examine why users are confident in the Bitcoin network, if the validation of transactions 
is not executed by a licensed intermediary but rather through self-regulatory protocols.  
(i) Cryptography  
The confidence in the  Bitcoin network is found in its cryptography, which is the underpinning 
technology that provides the security measures68 within the network to prevent 
misappropriation and counterfeiting of Bitcoins.69 Unlike money where such security features 
are embedded into the physical money70 the cryptography offers all of the security features for 
the Bitcoin network.71 
(ii) Cryptographic Keys  
The next part will discuss the network’s cryptographic digital signatures72 also known as the 
interlinked public and private cryptographic keys.73 In a brick and mortar world a paper-based 
signature serves two purposes, proof of identification74  and endorsement of a transaction.75 
Bitcoin’s cryptographic digital signatures perform the functional equivalence76 of a paper-
based signature by ensuring that its cryptographic keys serve the aforementioned purposes.  
 
Sovereign Currency Act 2018 for Republic of Marshall Islands. For the purpose of this dissertation, such 
cryptocurrencies will not receive any attention, as the risks and regulation arguably fall within the ambits of such 
central institution’s mandate. 
67 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 1. 
68 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 2. 
69 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 8. Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 3. Nabilou and Prüm op cit note 65 at 30. 
70 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 1. 
71 Ibid  
72 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 15. 
73 Narayanan and Clark op cit note 60 at 43. Furneaux op cit note 44 at 23. Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. 
74 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law (Model Law) on Electronic Commerce 
with Guide to Enactment in 1996 and further amended in 1998 at 19. Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 15. 
75 Model Law supra at 19. Ibid. 
76To determine the functional equivalence of a digital technology an evaluation is conducted on the functions 
which paper-based documents perform, in order to ensure that the digital technology can provide the same or 
similar functions see Model Law supra para 15. See Caroline B Ncube ‘Electronic Transaction Law’ (2017) 
LAWSA LexisNexis para 494, Jae Faria ‘E-commerce and International Legal Harmonization: Time to go beyond 
Functional Equivalence?’ (2004) 16(4) SA Merc LJ footnote 9. 
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In order to transact on the Bitcoin network, users require a ‘wallet’,77 which produces 
and stores the user’s keys78 and allows the user access to his cryptocurrencies and the 
transactional ledger.79 Each user is issued with a unique set of interlinked cryptographic keys 
which serve several purposes.80 The public cryptographic key indicates the user’s 
pseudonymous identity81 and Bitcoin address to which Bitcoins can be sent.82 While the private 
cryptographic key indicates the sender’s endorsement of the transaction83 and enables the 
receiver to access the Bitcoins.84 Therefore, the Bitcoins are never ‘physically’ in the users’ 
possession as they remain on the network.85 The private keys allow users access to spend such 
Bitcoins.86  
(iii) Cryptographic Hash Function  
A Bitcoin will only reflect on the transactional ledger and be at the user’s disposal if it was 
validated.87 This validation requires the cryptographic hash function.88 The hash function can 
simply be understood as a mathematical algorithm which transforms an input of infinite length 
to a finite output.89 A practical example of how the cryptographic hash function works, would 
be when an undetermined number of logs are placed in a manufacturing machine and a wooden 
chair comes out the other end of the machine.90 To ensure the integrity of the hash function the 
algorithm cannot be reversed.91 
 
77 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 61. Accordingly, users can store their cryptographic keys on a selection of 
wallets, such a paper wallet, where the cryptography keys are simply written down on paper, as this form of wallet 
is not saved on the internet it known as ‘cold storage’. Another example of a cold storage wallet is hardware 
wallets, such as a memory stick, onto which the cryptographic keys are stored. Then there are also software 
wallets, which store the cryptographic key on the internet, and are prone to hacking, thus software wallets are also 
known as ‘hot storage’, see Furneaux op cit note 44 at 96-102. 
78 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 61. The cryptocurrency is never physically within the user’s possession, as it 
remains in the network, see Max I Raskin ‘Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure’ (2015) vol. xx 
Fordham Journal Of Corporate & Financial Law 999. 
79 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 96. 
80 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 61. 
81 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 8. Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. Narayanan & Clark op cit note 60 at 43. 
Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 139, as the transactional ledger displays all transactions along with their 
associated cryptographic keys, it cannot be said that the transactions are anonymous but rather pseudonymous as 
the cryptographic keys are not linked to the user’s legal name.  
82 Narayanan and Clark op cit note 60 at 43. Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 61. 
83 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. 
84 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 96. 
85 Raskin op cit note 78 at 999. 
86 Raskin op cit note 78 at 978. 
87 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. 
88 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 3. Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 9. 
89 Kathryn Mitchell ‘Bitcoin from the Beginning’ (March 2014) Without Prejudice 62. Narayanan et al op cit note 
53 at 9. Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 191. 
90 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 17. 
91 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 20. 
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For a cryptographic hash function to be considered secure it must incorporate three 
qualities: (1) The hash function must be collision resistant,92 which means different inputs 
cannot produce the same output.93 Given that inputs are infinite and outputs are finite, it is 
plausible that at some point the outputs may start reoccurring.94 (2) The computation of the 
output must be swift for Bitcoin it takes approximately ten minutes.95 (3) The hash function 
must incorporate ‘puzzle friendliness’,96 meaning it must be immensely difficult to determine 
the input when presented with a partial input or with the output.97 These qualities are used to 
ensure the integrity of the network.    
In practice, if a user intends to send a Bitcoin the notification thereof would be sent to 
the entire network,98 all of the nodes would be notified of the proposed transaction. This 
transaction then is placed in the ‘mempool’99 awaiting validation from the miners.100 Miners 
will then compete to solve the SHA-256 algorithm of the proposed transaction.101 ‘Proof-of-
Work’102 simply means that miners put effort into solving the complex algorithm.103 The first 
successful miner will be rewarded with a newly generated Bitcoin104 and transaction fees.105 
Once the fixed amount of Bitcoins106 are in circulation miners will only receive transaction 
fees as an incentive to continue the mining function.107  
The incentives miners receive to perform the mining function, may be a vulnerability, as 
there is no contractual obligation or any legal ramifications in place if miners fail to add 
validated transactions to the blockchain. Once validated the proposed transaction’s 
unconfirmed status will change to confirmed and the information of the transaction will be 
placed in a ‘candidate block’108 awaiting to form part of the transactional ledger.109 In order to 
ensure synergy between the blocks in the blockchain the newest block, also known as the 
 
92 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 2. 
93 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 2-5. 
94 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 3. 
95 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 40. 
96 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 8. 
97 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 9. 
98 Mitchell op cit note 89 at 62. 
99 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 40. Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 181. 
100 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 69. 
101 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 8 
102 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 89. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 4. Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. 
105 Narayanan and Clark op cit note 60 at 42. 
106 The predetermined number is set at 21 million Bitcoins, which is the network’s method of avoiding inflation, 
see Nieman op cit note 60 at 1987.  
107 Brito and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. 




‘child’110 block, will always have a portion of the previous block’s, also known as the 
‘parent’111 block’s hash information in its block header.112 As blocks on the blockchain are 
arranged in chronological order113 the confirmed transaction’s block header will also include a 
timestamp.114 The block header will in turn include the root hash of the ‘Merkle tree’.115 
Therefore, the blocks on the blockchain are interlinked, by the Merkle Tree116 which is another 
security mechanism the Bitcoin network deploys to ensure the integrity of its transactions.117 
If a corrupt node tries to manipulate one block on the blockchain, such node would be 
required to manipulate every block, up until the ‘genesis block’.118 As the blocks are all 
interlinked, the manipulated block would not coincide with the validated blocks on the 
blockchain.119 In this manner the cryptography makes it mathematically unfeasible to 
manipulate the blockchain,120 as a manipulated block would easily be detected by the 
network.121  
As Bitcoin rules are consensus based if majority of the miners wish to adopt a new rule122 
or upgrade to a different software123 and the minority disagrees then the blockchain will split 
into what is known as a ‘fork’.124 The fork will result in two distinct blockchains, which have 
the same history before the forking took place.125 Forking may also be considered as a 
vulnerability when a user sends Bitcoins but due to an unsuspected fork the Bitcoins are paid 
twice as they are reflected on both such blockchains, this is known as a ‘replay-attack’.126  
 
110 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 162. 
111 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 161. 
112 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 11. 
113 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 1. 
114 Nakamoto op cit note 41 at 2. Timestamping transactions also prevents double spending, according to Brito 
and Castillo op cit note 43 at 4. A timestamped transaction can also be considered as digitally notarised transaction, 
according to Narayanan and Clark op cit note 60 at 38. 
115 Victoria Louise Lemieux ‘Trusting Records: is Blockchain Technology the Answer?’ (18 July 2016) vol.26 
no. 2 Records Management Journal 121. 
116 Narayanan and Clark op cit note 60 at 39. 
117 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 168. 
118 Antonopoulos op cit note 57 at 161. 
119 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 12. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 11. 
122 This is known as a ‘hard fork’, according to Furneaux op cit note 44 at 59. 
123 This is known as a ‘soft fork’, according to Furneaux op cit note 44 at 60. 
124 Furneaux op cit note 44 at 58-60. 
125 Bank for International Settlements ‘Cryptocurrencies: Looking Beyond the Hype’ (June 2018) Annual 
Economic Report 103.   
126 Lemieux op cit note 115 at 128. There are numerous other vulnerabilities in the self-regulating network, such 
as a ‘51% attack’, see Furneaux op cit note 44 at 41. A ‘sybil attack' see Narayanan et al op cit note 53 at 32. A 
‘man-in-the-middle attack’ see Lemieux op cit note 115 at 128. However, a lengthy discussion on these possible 
vulnerabilities in the network is not required for the purpose of this dissertation, suffice to state that the network 
is theoretically not beyond corruption. Plassaras Nicholas A, argues that these concerning aspects of the self-
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Despite the vulnerabilities illustrated above, cryptocurrencies are still attractive to users 
and have the ability for both legal and illegal borderless financial transactions, hence they 
should be regulated. This comparative analysis has illustrated that the efficiency of the 
Exchange Control Regulations and the Financial Intelligence Act are based entirely on the 
supervision exercised over licensed ADs and ADLAs. Therefore, the current laws are 
ineffective to regulating cryptocurrencies and require amendments. 
The permissionless cross-border cryptocurrencies could in theory be performing the same 
transactions but in a manner that evades Namibian law as they are currently out of the reach of 
the regulators in the absence of effective regulation. The ability to supervise cryptocurrencies 
and ensure their compliance with Namibian law is further obstructed by the fact that these 
cross-border transactions are conducted pseudonymously, coupled with the fact that 
jurisdictional uncertainty lingers for these borderless transactions. For the proposed regulation 
to be effective, it is important to understand the rationale behind the laws it seeks to protect, 
this will be done in chapter four.  
 
 
regulatory network can be remedied by the IMF and its members infiltrating the network in order to regulate it at 
grass-root level, see Plassaras Nicholas A ‘Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of 
the IMF’ (2013) vol 14 Chicago Journal of International Law 405-406. However, this dissertation, does not 
advocate for the regulation of the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies. 
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IV. CHAPTER 4: REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS 
This chapter is divided into three parts, the first part will assess the rationale behind capital and 
exchange controls and provide a synopsis of how government implements those controls. 
Thereafter, a comparative analysis will be conducted on selected countries’ approaches to the 
regulation of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions within their countries. The results of 
this benchmarking exercise will inform the final part of this chapter which provides the criteria 
for selecting the most appropriate regulatory framework for Namibia.  
a) The Rationale of Regulating Cross-border Transactions  
As this dissertation advocates for the regulation of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions in 
order to subject them to both AML/CFT laws as well as capital and exchange controls it is 
worth noting that the rationale behind the implementation of AML/CFT laws is essentially to 
ensure that the financial industry, especially the banking sector is solely used for legitimate 
purposes. The rest of this part of the chapter will focus its attention on capital and exchange 
controls. 
Conventionally, countries record a summary of their transactions in what is known as a 
‘balance of payments’.1 This accounting record reflects both domestic and cross-border 
transactions between residents and non-residents within a given country over a certain period.2 
The balance of payments is systematically divided into three accounts, namely the current, 
capital and financial accounts.3 The current account reflects trading activities of goods and 
services as well as various sources of incomes.4 The capital account displays the ‘nonfinancial 
assets’5 such as donations.6 While the financial account captures the change in ownership 
between net ‘financial assets and liabilities’.7  
In practice, the totals from the current and capital accounts should be equal to the total in 
the financial account.8 Naturally, it is in the best interest of an economy that such totals indicate 
a surplus in its balance of payments. In order to secure a surplus balance, the government, 
usually by means of the central bank, may impose firm regulations on cross-border transactions 
 
1 International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) 
(2009) at 9 (Manual). IMF Balance of Payments (1996) at 1.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid. Eugenia Andreasen, Martin Schindler & Patricio Valenzuela ‘Capital Controls and the Cost of Debt’ (2017) 
IMF Working Paper WP/17/135 8. 





which can cause instability within its economy.9 Such instability may be caused by the inflow 
of foreign money on a short-term basis that in turn results in unsustainable increases in the 
exchange rate in the domestic country.10 These transactions are concerning because if such 
money is removed as quickly as it entered the economy it can weaken the economy.11 Another 
example of cautionary transactions would be if residents spend their money in foreign 
countries, as this limits the growth of the domestic country and equally taxes its foreign 
reserves. Therefore, capital controls may be imposed to protect the financial industry especially 
the commercial banks in their developmental phase.12 
It is for these reasons, amongst others, that governments intervene by disciplining market 
forces through proactively regulating cross-border transactions. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) there are various forms of regulation which can restrict market forces.13 
By for instance, regulating the issuance of money for price stability,14 controlling the sale of 
foreign money and further subjecting cross-border transactions to regulation.15 
While the inflow of money can have significant advantages to a beneficiary country such 
as reducing the need to incur debt.16 It also has negative consequences, by placing an 
overreliance on the inflow of money, the beneficiary country may be compromising its 
opportunity to invest in sustainable forms of development like manufacturing.17  
In turn the outflow of money from a donor country may deplete its foreign reserves, 
especially if the donor country is a low-income or middle-income country like Namibia. As a 
result, government may intervene by regulating cross-border transactions with the imposition 
of capital and exchange controls to mitigate such adverse consequences. 
Essentially capital and exchange controls are used to preserve a country’s foreign 
reserves and thereby ensure that such country remains solvent. The greatest risk that cross-
 
9 In South African Reserve Bank and Another v Shuttleworth and Another 2015 (8) BCLR 959 (CC) it was stated 
that the primary purpose of capital and exchange controls is to ‘discourage the export of capital and to protect the 
domestic economy’ para 53. 
10 R. Barry Johnston & Natalia T. Tamirisa ‘Why Do Countries Use Capital Controls?’ (December 1998) IMF 
Working Paper WP/98/181 at 14. 
11 Jonathan D. Ostry et al ‘Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls’ (19 February 2010) IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/10/04 at 4. 
12 Johnston & Tamirisa op cit note 10 at 14. 
13 Ibid. Ostry et al op cit note 11 at 4. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ahmat Jidoud ‘Remittances and Macroeconomic Volatility in African Countries’ (2 March 2015) IMF Working 
Paper Working Paper No. 15/49 at 5. 
17 Meyer Dietmar & Shera Adela ‘The Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth: An Econometric Model’ 
(2017) vol. 18 no. 2 EconomiA 150. 
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border cryptocurrency transactions pose to Namibia’s capital and exchange controls is that in 
the absence of regulation they are in theory able to be converted into money and evade 
Namibia’s exchange controls. As well as when money is converted into cryptocurrencies and 
evades capital controls. Theoretically the money can be transferred out of Namibia, without the 
Bank’s prior approval, which in turn taxes Namibia’s foreign reserves.  
There are various forms of regulating cross-border transactions, for example, by 
subjecting transacting parties to procedural requirements,18 one of these requirements may 
include obtaining the prior approval from the relevant regulator.19 Governments can also 
discourage cross-border transactions by levying taxes against them.20 The form of regulation 
is not as important as achieving the desired result, which is ultimately the preservation of the 
country’s foreign reserves. 
Historically, the interwar and the period thereafter were characterised by exchange and 
capital controls all over the world,21 as countries desperately sought to stabilise their 
economies. As a result, on 22nd July 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference, the IMF legitimised 
capital controls in its Articles of Agreement.22 At a later stage, the IMF removed exchange 
controls because they were seen as a hinderance to global trade.23  
When countries’ economies began to stabilise, they did away with capital and exchange 
controls. As an illustration, the USA gradually removed its capital controls from 1974,24 while 
Europe followed suit in 1980.25 More countries removed their capital controls when they 
noticed that the controls had adverse effects, such as limiting economic growth by creating 
unpleasant conditions for foreign investment,26 thereby adversely affecting global trade.27  
The efficacy and need for exchange and capital controls may further be considered 
inconclusive when regard is had to the East Asian financial crisis that began in the middle of 
 
18 Age F.P. Bakker The Liberalization of Capital Movements in Europe: The Monetary Committee and Financial 
Integration 1958-1994 (1996) 11.  
19Ibid. 
20 Bakker op cit note 18 at 13. 
21 Christopher J. Neely ‘An Introduction to Capital Controls’ (November/December 1999) Review 13. 
22 In terms of Article VI s 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund of 15 September 
1993 (Articles of IMF). Neely op cit note 21 at 13. 
23 In terms of Article I (iv) of the Articles of the IMF op cit note 22. Natalia T. Tamirisa ‘Exchange and Capital 
Controls as Barriers to Trade’ (March 1999) vol. 46 no. 1 IMF Staff Papers 69. 
24 Neely op cit note 21 at 14.  
25 Bakker op cit note 18 at 1. 
26 Michael Frenkel et al ‘The Effects of Capital Controls on Exchange Rate Volatility and Output’ (November 




1997.28 During the crisis, Malaysia imposed both exchange and capital controls in a bid to 
salvage its economy.29 In 1998 the IMF stated that these controls were a setback to not only 
Malaysia but other emerging markets as they brought about uncertainty amongst investors.30 
Thailand on the other hand, imposed less severe controls.31 While Korea braved the crisis 
without imposing any controls.32 Ironically all three countries were able to weather the 
financial crisis,33 leading to the inclusive stance regarding exchange and capital controls.  
Nevertheless, in 2010 the IMF confirmed that capital controls may still be deployed when 
appropriate.34 However, countries utilising such controls should regularly evaluate the 
appropriateness thereof.35 Their appropriateness can be determined in terms of Article XIV of 
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement of 2016 which permits countries to impose capital controls in 
a manner that progressively works towards capital ‘liberalization’.36 The IMF further provides 
guidelines on how countries can steadily relinquish their capital controls while working 
towards capital liberalization.37  
The benefits of this transition include; global financial risk sharing38 and appropriate 
distribution of money which in turn propels economic growth.39 However, in terms of the 
‘impossible trinity’40 theory a country must strategically consider its options, because the 
hypothesis holds that a country will not be able to have (1) a stable foreign exchange rate,41  
(2) capital liberalization,42 and (3) monetary policy autonomy.43 At best a country can have two 
of the aforementioned options during a given period.44   
 
28 Steven Radelet et al ‘The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects’ (1998) vol. 1998 no. 1 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1. 
29 Frenkel et al op cit note 26 at 6. 
30 Frenkel et al op cit note 26 at 6-7. 
31 Frenkel et al op cit note 26 at 18-19. Radelet et al op cit note 28 at 28. 
32 Frenkel et al op cit note 26 at 18. Ibid. 
33 Frenkel et al op cit note 26 19. 
34 Ostry et al op cit note 11 at 15. 
35 Ibid. 
36 ‘Capital liberalization’ can be understood as a government’s decision to allow the flow of money into and out 
of its borders, according to Bakker op cit note 18 at 2. 
37 See Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al ‘Reaping the Benefits of Financial Globalization’ (2008) IMF Occasional Paper 
264. 
38 Dell’Ariccia op cit note 37 at 24. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Also known as the ‘trilemma’, according to Joshua Aizenman, Menzie David Chinn & Hiro Ito ‘The 
“Impossible Trinity” Hypothesis in an Era of Global Imbalances: Measurement and Testing’ (2013) vol. 21 no.3 
Review of International Economics 447. 
41 Ibid. 





That being so, governments must diligently consider the aforementioned factors to 
identify what is the most appropriate capital or exchange controls for its jurisdiction. If a 
country were to liberate capital flows and have a fixed foreign exchange rate, it may have to 
forfeit its monetary policy autonomy. Equally so, if a country maintains its monetary policy 
autonomy and liberates capital flows, it may in turn expose itself to volatile foreign exchange 
rates. Namibia as a member state of the CMA does not practice capital liberalization, as it 
imposes capital and exchange controls to ultimately remain solvent. 
b) Comparative Analysis of Cryptocurrency Regulation in Selected Jurisdictions  
In order to formulate Namibia’s regulatory framework for cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions, a benchmarking exercise will be conducted on selected countries’ cross-border 
cryptocurrency regulations. This exercise will be limited to the following core considerations: 
(1) has the country instilled the requirement of licensing cryptocurrency service providers? (2) 
If affirmative, does the licensing procedure remove the pseudonyms of users, allow for 
effective regulatory supervision and the implementation of preventative measures such as 
customer due diligence? (3) Does the cross-border cryptocurrency regulatory framework 
ensure compliance with the other laws of the selected country, particularly AML/CFT and 
where applicable its capital and exchange controls? (4) How does the regulation effectively 
dispense with jurisdictional concerns raised by these cross-border transactions?  
(i) South Africa  
At present, South Africa has no specific legislation or guidelines on the regulation of 
cryptocurrency transactions.45 Transacting with cryptocurrencies is not subjected to any 
licensing as such, the transacting parties assume the full risks of the transactions.46 The Crypto 
Assets Regulator Working Group, a branch under the Intergovernmental FinTech Working 
Group (IFWG), released the Consultation Paper on Policy Proposals for Crypto Assets which 
essentially proposes that South Africa should move to ‘limited regulation’47 by extending the 
legislative obligations of accountable institutions to cryptocurrency service providers,48 in 
terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 38 of 2001.  
 
45 The South African Reserve Banks website Frequently asked questions available at 
https://www.resbank.co.za/RegulationAndSupervision/FinancialSurveillanceAndExchangeControl/FAQs/Pages/
VirtualCurrenciesCryptocurrencies.aspx accessed on 23 January 2020. 
46 Crypto Assets Regulator Working Group IFWG Consultation Paper on Policy Proposals for Crypto Assets (16 
January 2019) para 5.3.4. 




When promulgated this regulation will require that service providers conduct the same 
customer due diligence and reporting requirements with their users as other accountable 
institutions are required to do. Cross-border transactions in and from South Africa are subjected 
to its Exchange Control Regulations. However, these controls may in theory be evaded in the 
absence of cryptocurrency regulation in South Africa.49  
(ii) Rwanda   
Rwanda’s position in terms of regulation of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions is similar 
to South Africa’s, in that it has no such regulation nor is there any indication at present that it 
intends to regulate these transactions. Despite this, Rwanda has taken a more embracive 
approach towards cryptocurrencies in general. In 2017 the National Bank of Rwanda (National 
Bank) released an article which alludes to the prospects of Rwanda creating its own 
cryptocurrency.50 Thereafter, in 2019 Bloomberg reported that the National Bank is currently 
conducting a benchmarking exercise on a selection of central banks such as that of the 
Netherlands and Singapore who have used blockchain technology.51 
(iii) South Korea 
The Financial Services Commission in conjunction with the Korean Financial Intelligence Unit 
require that cryptocurrency transactions be executed with the users’ legal name.52 This has been 
done by extending the traditional financial regulation to cryptocurrency transactions.53  
Further limiting the use of cryptocurrency transactions to citizens who have acquired the 
age of majority.54 Although this limitation is not necessarily good for foreign investment, it 
arguably assists the South Korean regulators with jurisdictional concerns that arise from cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions. 
 
49South Africa is however planning on attending to these concerns, see James Preston ‘Is the SA Reserve Bank 
about to Clamp Down on Crypto in South Africa? SA CRYPTO 30 November 2019 available at 
https://sacrypto.co.za/is-the-sa-reserve-bank-about-to-clamp-down-on-crypto-in-south-africa/ accessed on 3 
December 2019. 
50 Samuel Baker and Nyirakanani Regine ‘Cryptocurrencies: A threat to the Central Bank system?’ (2017) Global 
Insights 3. 
51 Saul Butera ‘Rwandan Central Bank Studying Ways of Issuing Digital Currency’ Bloomberg 22 August 2019, 
available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-22/rwandan-central-bank-studying-ways-of-
issuing-digital-currency accessed on 15 November 2019. 
52 Services Commission ‘Financial Measures to Curb Speculation in Cryptocurrency Trading’ (23January 2018) 
Press Release (Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release) 1. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 52 at 1. 
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South Korea further makes it mandatory for all cryptocurrency users to link their private 
cryptographic keys to their bank accounts.55 From a monitoring and supervisory stance users 
are restricted from transacting on cryptocurrency platforms as transactions can only be 
executed by service providers.56 It is for this reason that service providers who provide 
exchange services are required to have two separate bank accounts.57 The account that is used 
for users cryptocurrency exchanges is subjected to ‘enhanced due diligence’58 requirements to 
ensure that cryptocurrency transactions are adherent to anti-money laundering obligations.59 
Banks and service providers are further subject to inspections by the Financial Services 
Commission in conjunction with the Korean Financial Intelligence Unit.60  
In terms of AML/CFT laws, the Korean Financial Intelligence Unit’s Guidelines for 
Anti-Money Laundering with Cryptocurrency proscribes cryptocurrency transactions if the 
transacting parties’ identities are not confirmed.61 These Guidelines in addition to the Act on 
Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information seek to ensure that 
cryptocurrencies are not used for illicit purposes in South Korea.62 Moreover, the country seeks 
to ensure harmonious regulation by encouraging its members of the financial industry to share 
relevant information amongst themselves63 as well as to international service providers64 to 
ensure that cross-border cryptocurrency transactions do not evade the law.65  
At present Korea’s Parliament is deliberating the customised draft regulations for 
cryptocurrencies66 which seek to provide regulators with a direct approach to regulating 
cryptocurrencies. The Financial Intelligence Unit has also proposed enacting a licensing 
requirement in amendments to the Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction 
Information.67 These proposed amendments are in line with the FATF’s International Standards 
on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation 
 
55 Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 52 at 1. 
56 Apolline Blandin et al ‘Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape Study’ University of Cambridge 103. 
57 Financial Services Commission ‘Revision to Virtual Currency Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines’ (27 June 
2018) Press Release (Revision Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines Press Release) 1. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 52 at 1. 
60 Ibid  
61 Ibid Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 52 at para 3. 
62 Blandin et al op cit note 56 at 103. 
63 Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 52 at para 4. 
64 Revision Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines Press Release op cit note 57 at 1-2. 
65 Ibid. Financial Measures to Curb Speculation Press Release op cit note 57 at para 4. 
66 Blandin et al op cit note 59 at 103.  
67 Chainalysis ‘Economic Trends, Regulatory Updates, and Blockchain Analysis Enhancements’ APAC 
Cryptocurrency Report 9.  
37 
 
Recommendations of June 2019 (FATF Recommendations) for the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies.68  
(iv) European Union 
The European Union (EU) has amended its position to address the concerns of illicit flows of 
money with the use of cryptocurrencies. These amendments are captured in Directive (EU) 
2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30th May 2018 (5th AML Directive). 
This Directive extends the scope of ‘obliged entities’69 to include service providers that provide 
exchange services and the custodians of customers private cryptographic keys.70 Compliance 
with the 5th AML Directive is mandatory for member states of the EU from 10th January 2020.71  
Germany is one of the member states that will have to comply with the 5th AML 
Directive. In general, the use of cryptocurrencies in Germany does not require a license from 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) 
(BaFin).72 However, all users or service providers who seek to provide financial services for 
commercial gain in Germany require prior written approval from BaFin.73 By virtue of it 
granting authorisation74 BaFin has regulatory supervision over such service providers and may 
thus subject them to the same legal obligations as other financial institutions in Germany. 
While rendering financial services for commercial gain without a license is an offence,75 
it is still uncertain whether cryptocurrency service providers require such license.76 It is 
apparent that Germany needs cryptocurrency regulation to dispense with these discrepancies. 
In order to ensure compliance with the 5th AML Directive Germany will at the very least need 
 
68 Chainalysis ‘Economic Trends, Regulatory Updates, and Blockchain Analysis Enhancements’ APAC 
Cryptocurrency Report 9. Recommendation 15 of the Financial Action Task Force ‘International Standards on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (June 2019) (FATF 
Recommendations). 
69 As provided for in Article 2 of the Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 May 2015, obliged entities are equivalent to Namibia’s accountable institutions. 
70 In terms of Article 1(c) of the Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
May 2018 (5th AML Directive). 
71 In terms of Article 4(1) of the 5th AML Directive. 
72 Federal Financial Supervisory Authority’s (BaFin) Website available at 
https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/FinTech/VirtualCurrency/virtual_currency_node_en.html accessed on 26 
January 2020. 
73 In terms of s 32 (1) of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) (German Banking Act). 
74 In terms of s 33 (1) of the German Banking Act. 
75 In terms of s 54 of the German Banking Act.  
76 See Online & Recht available at https://www.online-und-recht.de/urteile/Handel-mit-Bitcon-ist-nicht-strafbar-




to have a register containing all of the prescribed information of its service providers.77 This 
register may assist Germany with defending jurisdictional challenges.  
Cross-border transactions trigger certain reporting requirements to the Bundesbank in 
terms of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance.78 The definition for payment in s 67(3) 
of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance is arguably wide enough to include any legal 
classification Germany may ascribe to cryptocurrencies. Nevertheless, in the absence of 
regulation it remains to be seen how Germany can monitor and enforce these provisions.  
Italy, as another EU member state has resolved to regulate cryptocurrencies through its 
Inland Revenue in its Resoluzione N.72/E of 2nd September 2016. As such service providers 
that operate in Italy are first required to be licensed before commencing with business 
activities.79And are further required to be compliant with all AML/CFT laws,80 which includes 
linking customers’ legal names to their cryptographic wallets.81 This licensing process assists 
Italy in removing pseudonymous transactions for illicit purposes and may further address 
jurisdictional concerns.    
(v) New York in the USA 
Although the Congress of the United States is still deliberating the ‘Virtual Currency Consumer 
Protection’82 Bill, the Department of Financial Services (Department) for the State of New 
York has since 201583 required all commercial cryptocurrency activities84 to be subjected to a 
 
77 5th AML Directive op cit note 70 para 20, 33-5.  
78 In terms of s 67 (1) of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance. 
79 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual 
Asset Service Providers (June 2019) (FATF Guidance) at 46. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid. 
82 US Congress Website available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/7224/text?format=txt accessed on 22 November 2019. 
83 New York State Department of Financial Services Website 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1509221 accessed on 22 November 2019. 
Susan Alkadri ‘Defining and Regulating Cryptocurrency: Fake Internet Money or Legitimate Medium of 
Exchange?’ (2018) vol.17 no.1 Duke Law & Technology Review 84. 
84 Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State of New York Title 23. Financial Services 
Chapter I. Regulations of the Superintendent of Financial Services Part 200. Virtual Currencies in terms of s 200.1 




ault) accessed on 22 November 2019. 
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license issued by the Department.85 The license is also known as a ‘BitLicense’.86 As the 
licenses are issued by the Department,87 it has regulatory supervision over service providers as 
its powers include suspension or revocation of licenses,88 examining the affairs of service 
providers.89 In essence, the New York Regulations extend the conventional framework of 
banking regulations to licensed service providers.  
Applicants are required to make full disclosures of prescribed information including the 
submission of fingerprints by their primary officers.90 Similar disclosures are required from the 
service provider’s users.91 The New York Regulations also require service providers to be 
compliant with all of New York’s and federal laws,92 including AML obligations.93 In terms 
of preventing money laundering each service provider is required to assess its risks and 
customise a program to address those risks.94 
Jurisdictional concerns are addressed in the New York Regulations by purposely limiting 
the scope of application to commercial transactions that either involve New York or are 
executed by New York residents.95 For the efficacy of enforcing its regulations New York 
prohibits service providers from transacting with service providers that only have a digital 
presence.96  
This benchmarking exercise has revealed that while South Africa and Rwanda lag 
behind, countries such as South Korea, the EU and the state of New York are proactively 
regulating cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. By ensuring that they know who 
transgressed their regulations and placing such transgressors within their reach with a form of 
licensing. This provides these countries with regulatory supervision. And addresses possible 
 
85 In terms of s 200.3(a) of the New York Regulations. The New York Regulations also provides for instances 
where the use of cryptocurrencies will be exempted from requiring a license in terms of s 200.3(c)(1)-(2) of the 
New York Regulations. 
86 New York State Department of Financial Services Website 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1509221 accessed on 22 November 2019. 
However, the reaction from industry is that the requirements for a BitLicense are too stringent and costly, see 
Alkadri op cit note 83 at 84. 
87 In terms of s 200.6(b) of the New York Regulations. 
88 In terms of s 200.6(c) of the New York Regulations. 
89 In terms of s 200.13 of the New York Regulations. 
90 In terms of s 200.4(1)-(5) of the New York Regulations. 
91 In terms of s 200.12 and 200.15(h)(1) of the New York Regulations. If the customer is a foreigner, the due 
diligence requirements are more stringent in terms of s 200.15(h)(2) of the New York Regulations.  
92 In terms of s 200.7(a) of the New York Regulations. 
93 In terms of s 200.15 of the New York Regulations. 
94 In terms of s 200.15(b) of the New York Regulations. While s 200.15(c) of the New York Regulations details 
the minimum requirements, such program should include.  
95 In terms of s 200.2(q) of the New York Regulations. 
96 In terms of s 200.15(h)(3) of the New York Regulations. 
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jurisdictional challenges by either prohibiting non-citizens from engaging in cryptocurrency 
transactions on their platforms, as seen in South Korea. Alternatively, by extending the scope 
of their regulation to service providers licensed within their jurisdiction or transactions that 
took place within their jurisdiction, as seen in the state of New York. Therefore, if a matter is 
brought before their courts, they would have jurisdiction over these borderless cryptocurrency 
transactions because they can enforce their judgments against their residents and the service 
providers in their jurisdictions. 
c) Criteria for an Appropriate Regulatory Framework for Namibia 
The ultimate purpose of Namibia’s cross-border regulation should be to protect the integrity of 
its financial industry while at the same time preserving its foreign reserves. Building on the 
benchmarking exercise, this can be achieved by ensuring the accountability and transparency 
of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions.  
As a primary consideration for its regulatory framework for cryptocurrencies, Namibia 
should determine which parties its regulators should supervise. Due to the fact that Namibia 
places restrictions on the movement of money outside of the CMA on both customers and 
service providers, therefore the cross-border cryptocurrency regulation must include the 
licensing of service providers and also subjecting their users to such regulation by prohibiting 
users from transacting without a licensed service provider. Further in line with Namibia’s 
capital and exchange controls, the proposed regulation should have supervision over both 
commercial and non-commercial cryptocurrency transactions. This will place the same legal 
requirements on cross-border cryptocurrency transactions as money.  
The regulation should also provide for effective regulatory supervision by the Bank and 
the Centre. Furthermore, there should be requirements that limit cryptocurrency transactions to 
a legal name basis, subjecting licensed service providers to satisfying due diligence 
requirements and other AML/CFT requirements. As well as including the licensed service 
providers into the list of accountable institutions. Licensing will further ensure that cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions that involve Namibia or a Namibian resident is subjected 
to Namibian laws, thereby ensuring that Namibian courts have jurisdiction to enforce such 




V. CHAPTER 5: NAMIBIA’S REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CROSS-
BORDER CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSACTIONS 
Although the architects of Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies intended for their operations to 
fall outside the ambits of central regulation, the core problem with cryptocurrencies is their 
decentralised and borderless nature which is not subjected to robust financial regulation. 
Therefore, this dissertation has evaluated whether Namibia can regulate cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions, and has presented arguments that it is possible, though to a limited 
degree. This chapter will discuss the framework for Namibia’s regulation of cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions. 
a) Harmonisation will ward off Regulatory Arbitrage 
As cryptocurrency transactions are internet based, they are borderless in nature. Therefore, with 
the threat of regulatory arbitrage, it is essential to have a multitiered regulatory framework for 
effective regulation.1 This multitiered regulatory framework is required to ensure 
harmonisation of regulation amongst all countries. As it merely requires one lax country to 
compromise the entire regulatory regime.  
However, there is a lack of consensus amongst countries on the legal classification of 
cryptocurrencies,2 therefore it would be ill-advice to propose that such harmonisation be in the 
form of a binding treaty or an international agreement. Countries would be reluctant to sign on 
to a treaty or an international agreement which contradicts their ideologies.  
At this point in time it would be more feasible to create a comprehensive model law at 
an international level with the most essential provisions each country’s cryptocurrency 
regulation should contain. Such regulation should require service providers to be licensed. 
Subjecting both service providers and users to regulatory supervision and compliance with their 
laws. Thereafter, countries can build on the essential provisions according to their individual 
policies. The ideal international bodies to draft such model law are branched in the United 
Nations, namely the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
 
1 The Financial Action Task Force ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset 
Service Providers’ (June 2019) (FATF Guidance) paras 87 and 135. The Financial Action Task Force 
‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (June 
2019) (FATF Recommendations) Recommendations 36-40. The FAFT Recommendations further state that the 
regulatory supervision should be entrusted to a competent authority, therefore this dissertation argues that the 
Bank and the Centre would be able to dispense with cryptocurrency regulation effectively. Provided that they are 
equip with the appropriate regulations and detection methods for the offenders of such regulations. 
2 For example, Italy considers cryptocurrencies as foreign money, while South Africa is lending towards the 
classification of an asset. 
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who have in the past proven themselves competent to execute this task3 and the other 
international body is the International Money Laundering Information Network (IMoLIN) 
whose wealth of research on internet related money-laundering and financing of terrorism can 
assist in compiling a comprehensive model law.4 
As this model law seeks to provide guidance on regulating cryptocurrencies which are 
highly dependent on ever evolving technology, it should not be too prescriptive by trying to 
regulate the technology and rather regulate the transactions facilitated by such technology. This 
is vital, as prescriptive regulation may fail to take account of future technological 
advancements,5 causing the regulation to soon become outdated and ineffective.   
Thereafter, the African Union (AU) should adopt the essential provisions in a convention 
or agreement. This should be followed by the adoption by the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) at sub-regional level. Finally, Namibia should ratify6 and incorporate the 
essential provisions into national legislation and then build on them according to its ideologies. 
This can be done in two manners, either by merely drafting an amendment under the General 
Law Amendment Act7 to amend existing legislation such as the Banking Institutions Act, 
Payment Systems Management Act, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, the Companies Act, 
Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980, and the Exchange Control Regulations, and any other 
relevant financial legislation.  
Such amendments should seek to address administrative elements for cryptocurrency 
regulation. These elements include service providers’ obligation to have two separate accounts, 
the appointment and disqualification of directors, officers and auditors, and the fit and proper 
standards for principle officers. As well as cybersecurity and custodianship of private 
cryptographic keys requirements, disaster recovery plans, disclosures to customers, assumption 
of risks, and inspections by the Bank and the Centre. From a punitive perspective there should 
be an imposition of civil, criminal and administrative penalties for offenders of the proposed 
 
3 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ‘Modernizing International Trade Law to Support 
Innovation and Sustainable Development Proceedings of the Congress of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (4-6 July 2017) vol. 4 Vienna 94. 
4 IMoLIN website available at https://www.imolin.org/imolin/en/about_us.html accessed on 31 January 2020. 
5Regulators should find the equilibrium between being too prescriptive on one end and too vague on the other 
end. As vague regulation will be interpreted against the legislature, see S v Stassen 1965 (4) SA 131 (T). While 
prescriptive regulation will soon become outdated when technology advances further.  
6 Notably, once an international treaty is ratified by Namibia it arguably forms part of Namibian law in terms of 
Article 144 of the Constitution. 
7 General Law Amendment Act 14 of 2005. 
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regulation.8 A detailed discussion on these amendments fall outside the ambits of this 
dissertation.  
Alternatively, Namibia could create a customised legislation dealing specifically with 
cryptocurrency regulation, which would be more responsive to technological advancements 
than current legislation. As this unresponsiveness may create loopholes. An example of this is 
the uncertainty surrounding what is considered ‘electronic money’ in terms of Regulation 32(2) 
of the Financial Intelligence Regulations.9  
b) Unfeasible to Regulate the Technology Underpinning Cryptocurrencies 
At present date, it is arguably not feasible to attempt to regulate the technology that underpins 
cryptocurrencies. As illustrated in chapters two and three, the technology is not flawless.10 
Although the FATF recommends that countries create methods to detect persons who are 
performing cryptocurrency transactions outside of the ambits of regulation.11 It is argued that 
in order for such detection to be effective the technology would need to be regulated, which at 
present date is simply unfeasible.  
Notably, in intellectual property law the ‘graduated response schemes’,12 are recognised 
as a method of preventing copyright infringement on the internet through file sharing.13 The 
monitoring and enforcement of online copyright infringement is done by the internet service 
provider.14 Although these schemes are not shielded from criticism particularly for limiting a 
person’s right to a fair trial,15 a similar protocol may be implemented for internet service 
providers to monitor and report suspicious cryptocurrency transactions. But such protocol 
would need to overcome the safe harbour Namibia has given its internet service providers by 
 
8 In terms of criminal law, a person may not be tried or convicted for a ‘crime’ which was not a crime at the time 
it was committed, see Article 12(3) of the Constitution. See also Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Therefore, cryptocurrency regulation should clearly provide for the criminalisation of 
unlawful acts performed or omissions with the use of cryptocurrencies. FAFT Recommendation op cit note 1 at 3 
and 5 advises countries to criminalise the use of cryptocurrencies for money-laundering and terrorism financing 
and prescribe appropriate sanctions for the violation of such regulation in terms of Recommendation 4 and 35 of 
the FATF Recommendations op cit note 1. 
9 Financial Intelligence Regulations Government Notice 3 of 2015 made under the Financial Intelligence Act 13 
of 2012 (Financial Intelligence Act). 
10 See Stan Higgins ‘Coinbase CEO: Core Developers May Be Bitcoin’s Biggest Systemic Risk (6 March 2016) 
Coindesk available at https://www.coindesk.com/coinbase-brian-armstrong-risk-developers accessed on 27 
November 2019. 
11 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendations 16, 32 and 34. 
12 Caroline B Ncube ‘Copyright Enforcement: The Graduated Response Takes Centre Stage’ (2012) 24 SA Merc 
LJ 134. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid.  
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stating that they are under no general obligation to monitor internet activity.16 And further 
overcome possible privacy infringement claims.17 Accordingly, it is simply not feasible to 
attempt to regulate the technology at present. 
The next part of this chapter focuses its attention on Namibia’s regulation of cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions. In chapter four the key features for the formulation of Namibia’s 
regulation were discussed. Building on that discussion, the next hurdle is arguably the greatest 
one which entails an evaluation on how Namibia can ensure the efficacy of its cross-border 
cryptocurrency regulation. 
c) Jurisdictional Concerns 
While cryptocurrencies have proven themselves to be borderless, their regulation and 
subsequent enforcement is constrained to a certain geographical territory. Therefore, the 
fundamental requirement for cross-border cryptocurrency regulation is to address any possible 
jurisdictional challenges.18 Once jurisdictional concerns are addressed the regulation will have 
legitimacy. Phrased differently, cross-border cryptocurrency regulation devoid of an effective 
jurisdictional provision will be futile. In order to appreciate the challenges cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions pose to asserting jurisdiction it is imperative to first understand the 
legal principles surrounding jurisdiction. 
In terms of public international law, jurisdiction is vital to a country exercising its monopolist 
authority within its geographical territory.19 This authority is exercised by the government’s 
three branches namely, the executive, legislative and judiciary branch. As such, the jurisdiction 
of a country takes three forms which is the authority to enact laws over natural and juristic 
persons20 within its territory, this is known as ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’21 or ‘legislative 
 
16 Paragraph 55 of the Electronic Transactions Bill [B. 2 - 2019]. 
17 Article 13 of the Constitution.  
18 In earlier times, jurisdictional challenges arose in international law of the sea, particularly at the high seas where 
no country has monopolist jurisdiction. The law in this regard now provides all countries with prescriptive 
jurisdiction over the high sea. However, enforcement jurisdiction is limited to the countries whose ships are 
involved in a given dispute, see Donald R. Rothwell, Alex G. Oude Elferink and Karen N. Scott et al (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (2015) Oxford University Press 208-9. 
19 John Dugard SC et al Dugard's International Law: a South African Perspective 5 ed (2018) JUTA 210. This 
monopolist authority a country has within its geographical territory, which is most often exercised solely by such 
country, as provided for in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations. The Namibia’s geographical territory 
is detailed in Article 1(4) of the Constitution. Zongwe has indicated that having a geographical territory is a 
fundamental consideration for sovereignty, Prince Zongwe International Law in Namibia. (2019). Oxford: 
African Books Collective 142.  
20 Anthony J. Colangelo ‘What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (September 2014) vol. 99 no. 6 Cornell Law Review 
1310. 
21 Ibid. Dugard SC et al op cit note 19 at 211. 
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jurisdiction’.22 While ‘adjudicative jurisdiction’23 or ‘personal jurisdiction’24 is the authority a 
country has over natural and juristic persons to bring them before its courts and make a formal 
judgment against them.25 Whereas ‘enforcement jurisdiction’26 or ‘executive jurisdiction’27 
which is the authority a country has to ensure compliance with its laws,28 both in an 
administrative, civil and criminal context. All three of these forms of jurisdiction are essential 
for cryptocurrency regulation. 
In Namibia, a court will have jurisdiction over matters that arose within its geographical 
territory.29 In a civil matter this jurisdiction will be over persons who live or work,30 or own 
property within the courts geographical territory that the court is able to attach31 to assert its 
jurisdiction. Persons who fall outside the ambits of the court’s jurisdiction may be subjected to 
it by written agreement.32  
As Regulation 22 of the Exchange Control Regulations and s 63-5 of the Financial 
Intelligence Act attracts criminal liability for non-compliance, the discussion will now turn to 
evaluate the jurisdictional constraints in a criminal matter. A Namibian court will have 
jurisdiction over offences which were committed within the court’s geographical territory,33 as 
well as offences committed on its sovereign waters.34 In addition, offences that commenced or 
ended in Namibia.35 Moreover, a Namibian criminal court will have jurisdiction over an 
offence if at least one element of that offence took place within the court’s jurisdiction.36 
 
22 Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1310-11. 
23 Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1311. 
24 Ibid. Some countries seek to invoke the principle of ‘active personality’ to extend such country’s personal 
jurisdiction over its citizen even when they are outside of the country’s geographical territory, see TW Bennett & 
J Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) JUTA 50. 
25 Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1311. 
26 Ibid. Dugard SC et al op cit note 19 at 211. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1311. 
29 As provided for in the Constitution Chapter 9. See also s 26(1) and s 28(1)(d) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 
of 1944 (Magistrates’ Courts Act).  
30 Section 28(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, s 16 of the High Court Act 16 of 1990 (High Court Act). These 
matters can further be appealed or reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in terms of s 2, s 14(1) and s 16(1) 
of the Supreme Court Act 15 of 1990 (Supreme Court Act). 
31 Section 30bis of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. 
32 Section 45(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. 
33 Section 90(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, s 16 of the High Court Act. These matters can further be appealed 
or reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in terms of s 2, s 14(1) and s 16(1) of the Supreme Court Act. 
34 Section 90(2)(d) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. 
35 Section 90(2)(e) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. Notably, in S v Maseki 1981(4) SA 374 (T) (S v Maseki) held 
that courts do not have jurisdiction over crimes committed outside of its jurisdiction. Neither crimes that were 
completed outside of its jurisdiction. The court did however confirm that there are a few exceptions in this regard, 
such as high treason.  
36 Section 90(4) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act. 
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An illustration of the exercise of jurisdiction in a cross-border crime can be found in S v 
Mwinga and Others.37 Where a shot was fired from the Namibian border38 which then struck 
and subsequently killed a person in a canoe39 on the Zambian side of the Zambezi river.40  On 
appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal held that in order to confirm jurisdiction in a cross-border 
offence an inquiry must be made to determine whether the essential element of such offence 
took place within Namibia, in which case a Namibian court will have jurisdiction.41 
When seeking to assert jurisdiction to a cross-border offence, countries must be mindful 
that they have equal sovereignty42 and are therefore required to respect such sovereignty.43  
This is especially important to bear in mind when countries seek to exercise ‘extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’44 over another sovereign country. The instances when countries can apply 
extraterritorial jurisdiction are restricted to those instances provided for by international law.45  
In the international criminal law context there are certain crimes46 that are so grievous 
that they warrant the attention of the international community.47 In such instances countries 
have the authority to adjudicate over accused persons,48 regardless of their nationalities and the 
geographical territory where the offences were committed.49 This principle is known as 
‘universal jurisdiction’.50 The rationale behind universal jurisdiction is to ensure that persons 
 
37  S v Mwinga and Others (SA 1/95) [1995] NASC 2 (11 October 1995) (S v Mwinga). 
38 S v Mwinga supra at 12. 
39 S v Mwinga supra.  
40 S v Mwinga supra. 
41 S v Mwinga supra at 11. 
42 In term of Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter. 
43 Article 2(4) and (7) of the United Nations Charter. 
44 ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ occurs when a country exercises its jurisdictional powers, beyond its geographical 
territory, in another country, see Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1304. 
45 Dugard SC et al op cit note 19 at 210. See S.S. Lotus (France. v. Turkey.), 7 September 1927 PCIJ (Series A) 
No. 10 (Lotus) para 45, where the Permanent Court of International Justice held that extraterritorial jurisdiction 
may only be applied when it is legally permissible by international law. However, Lotus supra has been subjected 
to criticism, see Cedric Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law 2 ed (2016) 34. 
46 The International Court of Justice can adjudicate the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression in terms of Article 5(a)-(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
done in Rome on the 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 2187 No. 38544, 
Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
47 Bennett & Strug op cit note 24 at 56. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Bennett & Strug op cit note 24 at 56. See National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and 
Another v Southern Africa Human Rights Litigation Centre and Others [2013] ZASCA 168.  
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who violate the law are held accountable,51 especially when their countries fail to take action.52 
However, universal jurisdiction is reserved solely for prescribed international crimes.53   
Due to the novelty of cross-border cryptocurrency transactions there is presently no 
established public international law principles that confirms when states can exercise their 
jurisdiction over offences that arise out of such transactions. 
On the other hand, private international law seeks to resolve jurisdictional disputes with 
the ‘choice of law’54 principle. This principle involves taking one element of a cross-border 
transaction which gave rise to the dispute and ‘localizing’55 the entire transaction by creating a 
fiction that the entire cause of action arose within the selected jurisdiction. This assessment is 
done for the purposes of adjudication.56 Of course, in private international law parties can 
exercise their autonomy with regards to jurisdiction, however for the purposes of this 
dissertation Namibia’s regulation should prescribe the instances when it will have jurisdiction, 
as oppose to giving the parties the discretion.  
The jurisprudence of asserting jurisdiction in cyber law is in its infancy stage and has 
attracted a great deal of academic attention.57 Several countries have also sought to clarify the 
uncertainties surrounding cyber law jurisdiction.58 Much like cloud computing59 the 
cryptocurrency network that facilitates the cross-border transactions is reliant on the computer 
 
51 Saidat Nakitto ‘South Africa's Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2014) vol. 3 no. 1 International 
Human Rights Law Review 158.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Bennett & Strug op cit note 24 at 56. 
54 Ruth Hayward Conflict of Laws 4 ed (2006) 1. Jonathan Hill and Máire Ní Shúilleabháin Clarkson & Hill's 
Conflict of Laws 5 ed (2016) 2. 
55 Colangelo op cit note 20 at 1313.  
56 Ibid.  
57 See Rudnick Gray Cary, Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig (eds.) ‘Harmonizing Internet Law: Lessons 
from Europe’ (May 2006) vol. 9 no. 11 Journal of Internet Law 1-12. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson ‘Jurisdictional 
Issues and the Internet –a Brief Overview 2.0’ (2018) vol. 34 Computer Law & Security Review 715–722. 
Georgios I. Zekos ‘Cyber-territory and Jurisdiction of Nations’ (June 2012) vol.15 no.12 Journal of Internet Law 
3-23. Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman ‘Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in the Cloud’ (2013) 
vol. 73 no. 1 Maryland Law Review 313-388. Burke T.Ward & Janice C. Sipior ‘The Internet Jurisdiction Risk of 
Cloud Computing’ (2010) vol. 27 Information Systems Management (334–339). Paul Timmers ‘Challenged by 
“Digital Sovereignty”’ (December 2019) 23 No. 6 J. Journal of Internet Law 1-12, and Max I Raskin ‘Realm Of 
The Coin: Bitcoin And Civil Procedure’ (2015) vol. xx Fordham Journal Of Corporate & Financial Law 969-
1011. 
58 See Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.  See also Hague 
Conference Convention on Choice of Court Agreements of 30 June 2005. While the USA courts evaluate the 
activeness of a business’ website which is accessible in its geographical territory to determine jurisdiction see 
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  
59 ‘Could computing’ is an arrangement where customers store their data on a service provider’s serves, as oppose 
to storing such data on their own devices. The serves may be physically located in another country, see Dan 
Svantesson & Roger Clarke ‘Privacy and Consumer Risks in Cloud Computing’ (2010) vol.26 no.4 Computer 
Law and Security Review 391-2. 
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power of nodes physically located in various countries which gives rise to jurisdictional 
uncertainties. These uncertainties cannot be remedied with an attempt to impose ‘data 
localisation’60 restrictions, as this will prove to be futile due to the decentralised nature of the 
network. 
A vital aspect of determining the competency of a country to exercise jurisdiction over a 
cross-border cryptocurrency offence or dispute is whether such state would be able to 
effectively impose criminal, civil or administrative sanctions on offenders or disputants, 
respectively. A regulation will be considered effective if it is applied to the majority of society 
and they adhere to it.61 In terms of adjudication the test for effectiveness would be whether the 
court applies the regulation consistently and is able to enforce its judgment. Therefore, 
effectiveness requires an assessment of the reality of society’s behaviour in relation to such 
regulation.62 
The assessment of the validity of regulation, on the other hand, is more abstract, as it 
seeks to answer how ‘ought’63 the ideal society behave.64 In terms of legal theory, the validity 
and effectiveness of any regulation is interlinked but not interchangeable.65 As effectiveness is 
merely one of the conditions for such regulation to be consider valid.66 For this reason, even if 
regulation is not effective it is still considered valid67 until repealed. This dissertation argues 
that Namibia’s regulation should not merely seek to be valid but also effective. It is at this 
juncture that the dissertation recognises that the proposed cryptocurrency regulation will only 
be partially effective, in that it will lack the ability to detect persons who continue to engage in 
cross-border transactions devoid of such regulation. As at this stage, it is ill-advice for Namibia 
to attempt to regulate the technology that would assist with such detection.  
Nevertheless, Namibia should still regulate the licensed service providers and their users 
for the purpose of risk mitigation. In order to ensure the efficacy of regulation, in the absence 
of methods to detect users transacting outside of the proposed regulation, Namibia should 
 
60 ‘Data Localisation’ can be understood as imposing regulations on where data is stored and sent, see Erica Fraser 
‘Data Localisation and the Balkanisation of the Internet’ (December 2016) vol.13 no.3 SCRIPTed 360. 
61 Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law and State 3 ed (1949) Transaction Publishers 24. Hans Kelsen Pure Theory 
of Law 2 ed (1967) Berkeley: University of California Press 210. Hans Kelsen, ‘On the Basis of Legal Validity’ 
(1981) 26 American Journal of Jurisprudence 181. 
62 Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 39-40. Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 
212. 
63 Hans Kelsen, American Journal op cit note 61 at 181. 
64 Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 212. 
65 Hans Kelsen General Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 42. 
66 Ibid. Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 213.  
67 Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law op cit note 61 at 209. 
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restrict its regulation to disputes and offences in which it can enforce its regulation by 
subsequent judgments or orders. Such instances are arguably when the offender resides, 
conducts their business and is licensed within Namibia’s territory. As an additional 
precautionary measure, the license should also require service providers and their users to 
consent in writing to Namibia’s jurisdiction. Namibia can also exercise jurisdiction when the 
offensive cryptocurrency is sent or received by a private cryptographic key which is licensed 
in Namibia. Therefore, the regulation must prescribe that cryptographic keys are linked to a 
Namibian bank account. For if regulators have access to the private cryptographic key,68 they 
have access to the cryptocurrencies associated with such key.69  And will thus be able to seize 
and forfeit such cryptocurrencies to the state which were used in contravention of the Exchange 
Control Regulations or Financial Intelligence Act, thereby giving such regulation efficacy.   
d) Licensing Requirement    
From a regulatory perspective, the purpose of licensing can be seen as a manner for regulators 
such as the Bank and the Centre to monitor and enforce compliance with their respective laws. 
In essence, the licensing of service providers and prescribing that users solely transact with a 
licensed service provider will bring them within the ambits of regulation and ensure risk 
mitigation.  
In 2014 Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)70 
conducted a benchmarking exercise to determine the regulatory framework in the currency 
exchange sector of their member states and came across the common three requirements for 
licensing: (1) fit and proper beneficial owners and principal employees,71 (2) minimum capital 
requirements72 and (3) the ability to comply with the law.73 These requirements are similar in 
the banking sector. As the core requirements for licensing banks are: (1) minimum capital 
 
68 Raskin op cit note 57 at 978.  
69 Ibid. 
70 ESAAMLG has been associated with the FATF since 2010, it is a regional association that assists its members 
states with AML/CFT measures. Namibia is a member of ESAAMLG, see ‘Typologies Report on Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing through the Money Remittance and Currency Exchange Sector in the 
ESAAMLG Region’ (31 August – 6 September 2014) Luanda, Angola. FATF Website available at 
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/easternandsouthernafricaanti-moneylaunderinggroupesaamlg.html accessed on 
28 January 2020.  
71 ESAAMLG ‘Typologies Report on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing through the Money Remittance 
and Currency Exchange Sector in the ESAAMLG Region’ (31 August – 6 September 2014) 10 para (a). 
72 ESAAMLG op cit note 71 at 10 para (b). 
73 ESAAMLG op cit note 71 at 10 para (c). 
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requirements,74 (2) risk management75 and (3) the ability to comply with the law.76 This 
dissertation proposes that the same licensing requirements should be transposed to 
cryptocurrency service providers in Namibia’s cryptocurrency regulation and as such will be 
discussed at more length. 
(i) Minimum Capital Requirements77   
In order to ensure the solvency of the banking sector and the protection of their investors and 
depositors, the Bank imposes the minimum capital requirement. This requires commercial 
banks to at all times have more capital than its ‘risk weighted assets’78 or its overall debts79 in 
order to ensure that at any given moment the commercial bank can extinguish its debts80 and 
not require the Bank’s assistance to satisfy such debts.81 Sufficient capital forms part of the 
ultimate risk management assessment that is done on commercial banks.82 The same capital 
requirement must be transposed to cryptocurrency service providers to safeguard their users. 
(ii)  Risk Management 83 
Ensuring the safety of deposits84 is but one of the many risks the Bank assesses before licensing 
a commercial bank.85 Ultimately, the Bank requires of commercial banks to have sufficient 
controls in place to ward off, or at the very least mitigate risks. Such mitigation ensures the 
stability of the financial industry and even more so the economy of Namibia. Due to their 
decentralised nature, cryptocurrencies are presently not affected by systemic risk factors.86 But 
by way of licensing and thereby inclusion into the robustly regulated financial industry they 
 
74 In terms of s 9(1)(a), s 11(1)(c) read with s 28 of the Banking Institutions Act. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ (15 December 2019) (Basel Committee Core 
Principles) 17, 42, 43, 50, 62, 66, 67. 
75 In terms of s 11(1)(i) of the Banking Institutions Act. 
76 In terms of s 11(1)(iA) of the Banking Institutions Act. 
77 In terms of s 9(1)(a), s 11(1)(c) read with s 28 of the Banking Institutions Act. Likewise, the Bank may determine 
the composition of that capital in terms of s 29 of the Banking Institutions Act. In terms of s 9(1)(a), s 11(1)(c) 
read with s 28 of the Banking Institutions Act. Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 17, 42, 43, 50, 
62, 66 and 67. 
78 Section 28(1)(b) of the Banking Institutions Act. 
79 Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 19 and 63. 
80 Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 19. 
81 In terms of s 32 of the Bank of Namibia Act. 
82 Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 18. 
83 In terms of s 11(1)(i) of the Banking Institutions Act. Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 17, 18, 
42 and 43. 
84 Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 19. 
85 Other risks include credit risks, legal risks, liquidity risks, concentration of risks, operational risks to name a 
few, see Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 19-20. 
86 Panagiota Makrichoriti and Georgios Moratis ‘BitCoin’s Roller Coaster: Systemic Risk and Market Sentiment’ 
(July 2016) 4. ‘Systemic risk’ can be understood as the considerable loss of assets by several entities within an 
industry or economy as a whole, see Dunia Prince Zongwe ‘Conjuring Systemic Risk Through Financial 
Regulation by SADC Central Banks’ (June 2011) SADC Law Journal 104. 
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may become too close to the banking sector. And the risks associated with cryptocurrencies, 
such as their volatility, which is not subject to the Bank’s monetary policy strategies, may spill 
over and cause the downfall of the banking sector. 
As the primary objective of all financial regulation is to ward off systemic risk,87 
Namibia’s regulation for cross-border cryptocurrencies must therefore subject service 
providers to the same risk management requirements. At a policy level the greatest hinderance 
to the adoption of cryptocurrencies in Namibia is the assumption of risk by their users. 
Addressing such risks may accelerate their adoption. 
(iii) The Ability to Comply with the Law88 
In the banking sector an applicant commercial bank must satisfactorily display its ability to 
operationally comply with all relevant laws, particularly the Payment Systems Management 
Act, Financial Intelligence Act, Banking Institutions Act and the Exchange Control 
Regulations, already at the point of application. This part will now focus on the legal 
obligations in terms of the Financial Intelligence Act and the Exchange Control Regulations as 
emphasised throughout this dissertation. 
One of the main reasons for regulating the banking sector is to ensure that it is utilised 
solely for legitimate purposes.89 Therefore, AML/CFT laws are prescribed to ward off the 
misuse of commercial banks for illicit activities.90 The FATF has advised countries to adopt a 
risk-based approach to the regulation of cryptocurrencies.91 Consequently it recommends 
extending AML/CFT laws to cryptocurrency users and service providers92 by licensing them.93  
And requiring competent regulators to ensure compliance with their AML/CFT obligations.94  
These obligations include preventative measures such as customer due diligence95 and 
reporting of suspicious transactions.96 
 
87 Dunia Prince Zongwe op cit note 86 at 102. 
88 In terms of s 11(1)(iA) of the Banking Institutions Act. 
89 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Core Principles op cit note 74 at 16. 
90 Basel Committee Core Principles op cit note 74 at 14. 
91 In terms of Recommendation 1 of FATF Recommendations op cit note 1. FATF Guidance op cit note 1 at para 
86. 
92 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendation 15. FATF Guidance op cit note 1 at 20.  
93 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendations 14-15. 
94 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendation 26-28. 
95 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendation 10. In terms of FATF Recommendation 13, service 
providers should do a due diligence on correspondent bank in a cross-border transactions. 
96 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendation 20. 
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FATF further advises jurisdictions to ensure that their regulations criminalise the use of 
cryptocurrencies for money-laundering and terrorism financing,97 and to prescribe appropriate 
sanctions for violation of such regulations.98 The FATF Recommendations also discourages 
transacting with a correspondent country with weak AML/CFT laws.99 The EU has transposed 
the same obligation by prohibiting members states from facilitating cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions with countries outside of the EU that have weak AML laws,100 
unless the member states are able to mitigate the risks associated with such transactions.101  
In order to address jurisdictional concerns, the FATF recommends licensing a service 
provider in the country in which it is established.102 Service providers that conduct cross-border 
transactions should also be licensed in the host countries.103 Nevertheless, the FAFT 
encourages countries to assist each other in enforcing their regulations.104 An illustration of 
this is South Korea, that engages in information sharing amongst international cryptocurrency 
service providers to subject cross-border cryptocurrency transactions to the law.  
To ensure the integrity of its financial industry while preserving Namibia’s foreign 
reserves, its cryptocurrency regulation should license all service providers who reside or 
conduct their business in Namibia. The licensed service providers should thereafter be 
subjected to the same legal obligations as ADs, in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations 
and accountable institutions in terms of the Financial Intelligence Act. Both commercial and 
non-commercial cryptocurrency transactions must be regulated by the proposed regulation. 
This wide scope of application differs from that of New York and the EU that have only 
licensed and supervised service providers for commercial purposes.105 However, from a policy 
perspective Namibia needs to provide a different stance because it imposes capital and 
exchange controls on cross-border transactions. For Namibia’s cryptocurrency regulation to 
ensure that the exchange of cryptocurrencies into money and vice versa does not deplete 
Namibia’s foreign reserves or evade its capital and exchange controls, Namibia will need to 
 
97 In terms of Recommendations 3 and 5 of the FATF Recommendations op cit note 1. 
98 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendation 35. In terms of Recommendation 4 this can include 
seizing, blocking and where appropriate confiscating cryptocurrencies. 
99 FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at 14. 
100 The Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 (5th AML 
Directive) para 12. 
101 Ibid. 
102 FATF Guidance op cit note 1 at para 79. 
103 FATF Guidance op cit note 1 at para 81. 
104FATF Recommendations op cit note 1 at Recommendations 37-40.  
105 In the EU ‘service providers’ are those institutions who exchange cryptocurrency and the custodians of private 
cryptographic keys, see 5th AML Directive op cit note 100. 
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proactively regulate cross-border cryptocurrencies in the same way it does money.106 By 
prescribing that all cross-border cryptocurrency transactions outside of the CMA require the 
approval or exemption from the Bank before the transaction is facilitated.  
This proactive regulation of cryptocurrencies can arguably only be done if licensed 
service providers are the sole custodians to users’ private cryptographic keys. As in South 
Korea, Namibia should also link users’ Namibian bank accounts to their private cryptographic 
keys, which will ensure that users transact under their legal names. The licensing of 
cryptocurrencies allows the Centre to place service providers under the same obligations as 
accountable institutions. Namibia’s cryptocurrency regulations should also proscribe users 
from engaging in cross-border cryptocurrency transactions privately, as all cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions sent or received by Namibia should be executed by a licensed 
service provider. Moreover, the regulation must require the conversion of cryptocurrencies into 
money and vice versa in Namibia, to be restricted to licensed service providers and their users. 
Finally, appropriate penalties should be imposed for failure to comply with the cryptocurrency 
regulation. 
Thereby ensuring that cross-border cryptocurrency transactions that are sent or received 
in Namibia are transparent and accountable to the Bank and the Centre. The incentive for users 
and service providers to subject themselves to Namibia’s cryptocurrency regulation is that they 
are able to transact with cryptocurrencies within the bounds of the protection offered by the 
law. And without fear of being criminally, civilly or administratively sanctioned for non-
compliance. However, due to the nature of cryptocurrencies blockchain technology this form 
of regulation has its limitations, as users and service providers are still theoretically able to 
transact using cryptocurrencies devoid of Namibia’s cryptocurrency regulation. 
To conclude, this chapter proposed a multitiered regulatory framework to regulate cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions. The framework included a model law at an international 
level, which would ensure harmonisation amongst countries, to avoid threat of regulatory 
arbitrage. And then continental and sub-regional integration of such model law. Thereafter, a 
national cryptocurrency regulation which seeks to mitigate risks that may arise from cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions by licensing service providers and subjecting such service 
providers and their users to the obligations imposed by such license. Which includes the 
extension of the scope of the Financial Intelligence Act and the Exchange Control Regulations 
 
106 This provision is coherent with the principle of technological neutrality. 
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to cryptocurrency transactions that are sent or received in Namibia. The next chapter will 




VI. CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 
REGULATION  
Drawing from the discussions in the previous chapters, and the regulatory framework proposed 
in chapter five, this chapter will recommend how Namibia can implement its cross-border 
cryptocurrency regulations in the most effective manner. 
As detailed above, Namibia robustly regulates its financial industry, and for the purpose 
of this dissertation emphasis was placed on how it regulates the movement of money in and 
out of the country. The primary purpose of the Bank regulating its sector in the financial 
industry is to ensure that Namibia remains solvent. Every economic policy deployed by the 
Bank is for this purpose, as the assurance of the value in Namibia’s money stems from the fact 
that the Bank has the ability to extinguish its debts. This is made possible when the Bank has 
sufficient foreign reserves to not only extinguish debts but also shield its economy from any 
financial crisis. Namibia’s foreign reserves can be seen as its safety net. Consequently, laws 
that keep this safety net intact are crucial and any threat thereto should be considered as critical.  
This dissertation has displayed how cross-border cryptocurrency transactions can in 
theory circumvent Namibia’s capital and exchange controls, when cryptocurrencies are 
converted into money it may cause an unsustainable appreciation of its economy. It was also 
displayed that when money is converted into cryptocurrencies and taken out of the country 
undetected it may cause a shortfall in its balance of payments and ultimately deplete the so-
called safety net. 
Moreover, it was further argued that the risks associated with cross-border transactions 
are exacerbated by decentralised borderless cryptocurrencies, void of regulation. And the law 
in Namibia is currently unresponsive to the reality of society’s behaviour. This oversight is 
further worsened by the fact that users and service providers who seek to circumvent Namibian 
laws are aware that Namibia lacks the institutional capacity and technology to detect and 
monitor users and service providers outside of the proposed regulatory framework. 
It is unfortunate that the regulatory framework in chapter five is to a large degree 
dependent on service providers and users voluntarily subjecting themselves to regulation.  First, 
because by their very nature cryptocurrencies operate efficiently in the absence of regulation. 
Secondly, there is currently no way to effectively detect service providers and users who are 
transacting through Namibia devoid of such regulation. Consequently, this dissertation merely 
provided the first phase to mitigate the risks that cross-border cryptocurrency transactions pose 
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to Namibia’s economy. The enhancement of the proposed regulation will come with the ability 
to detect service providers and users that are transacting outside of the regulation, as such 
detection is presently not possible.  
While FATF has provided its member states with Recommendations and a Guidance on 
how to regulate cross-border cryptocurrency transactions to ensure the integrity of the financial 
industry. The reality is that such Recommendations and the Guidance are also limited by the 
fact that countries are unable to detect service providers and users who do not voluntarily 
subject themselves to licensing or registration.  
Without ranking the importance of regulation that mitigates the risks associated with 
capital and exchange controls to that of AML/CFT laws, it is submitted that the proactive 
regulation of capital and exchange controls in itself requires ADs and ADLAs to conform with 
the essential elements of AML/CFT laws. These elements include knowing who the transacting 
parties are and where the money is going or coming from, before a transaction is facilitated. 
Therefore, despite international oversight in this regard the regulation of capital and exchange 
controls are equally as imperative as AML/CFT laws in terms of the regulation of 
cryptocurrencies. 
Thus, it is recommended for Namibia to commence regulating cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions for risk mitigation without delay. Ideally, this would first require 
international harmonisation to avoid regulatory arbitrage. Nevertheless, even in the absence of 
an international harmonised model law, Namibia can at present implement the regulatory 
framework detailed in chapter five for the purpose of risk mitigation. 
Although the legal classification of cryptocurrencies as money in Namibia is imperative 
to the efficacy of the proposed regulation, it is submitted that the failure to classify 
cryptocurrencies as money in no way shields Namibia from the risks associated with cross-
border cryptocurrencies nor does it make cryptocurrencies less attractive for criminal use. 
Therefore, it is recommended that to facilitate the regulation proposed in chapter five, Namibia 
should amend its definition of ‘currency’ to include cryptocurrencies in the Bank of Namibia 
‘Bill’. As well as any other reference to money or payment instrument in Namibian law. This 
would include and remedy the definition of ‘electronic money’ in the Financial Intelligence 
Act. 
In addition, the Financial Intelligence Act should include cryptocurrency service 
providers as accountable institutions. Equally so, service providers must be licensed as ADs 
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for the purpose of the Exchange Control Regulations. Both the Financial Intelligence Act and 
the Exchange Control Regulations should criminalise the use of cryptocurrencies that evade 
their laws.  
On the premise of the judgment in the Shuttleworth case, Namibia’s parliament should 
amend the problematic s 9 of the Exchange Control Act, and thereby allowing for parliament 
to enact new Exchange Control Regulations. These new Regulations should establish the Bank 
as opposed to the Ministry of Finance, as the regulator of exchange and capital controls. This 
will avoid exposing Namibia to judicial scrutiny because of unlawful sub-delegation, which is 
a present threat under the current Exchange Control Regulations.  
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VII. CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
(a) Conclusion  
This dissertation evaluated whether Namibia could regulate cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions and concluded that it was possible to a certain degree. It proposed a regulatory 
framework for such cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. This was done by first evaluating 
the policy considerations for Sub-Saharan Africa to embrace the digital environment and its 
technologies to propel its economic growth. Therefore, advocating for the regulation of cross-
border cryptocurrency transactions, as cryptocurrencies can theoretically lower the entry level 
to financial inclusion. 
Thereafter, a comparative analysis between the centralised model of regulating cross-
border transactions to that of the self-regulatory cryptocurrency network was conducted. This 
was done in order to determine whether there is a need to amend regulations to effectively 
address cross-border cryptocurrency transactions. The analysis revealed that the current 
regulations required amendments to effectively regulate cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions. This was followed by evaluating the rationale for the implementation of 
AML/CFT laws as well as the rationale of capital and exchange controls.  
A comparative analysis was conducted on selected countries to evaluate their present 
regulations to cross-border cryptocurrencies which informed the discussion on Namibia’s 
proposed regulatory framework. This framework proposed a multitiered regulatory response, 
including a model law to ensure harmonisation amongst countries. Thereafter, Namibia’s 
cryptocurrency regulation was discussed. This regulation required the licensing of 
cryptocurrency service providers and further subjecting their users also to the restrictions 
placed under such license, for both commercial and non-commercial cross-border 
cryptocurrency transactions. This dissertation argued that licensed service providers should be 
included as ADs and accountable institutions in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations 
and Financial Intelligence Act, respectively. Thereby bringing cross-border cryptocurrency 
transactions within their sphere of regulation.  
Which in turn, addresses jurisdictional concerns and assists the Bank and the Centre to 
effectively implement their regulatory supervision to ensure the integrity of Namibia’s 
financial sector and the preservation of its foreign reserves. This dissertation noted that the 
proposed regulation could be seen as the first phase to effectively regulating cross-border 
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cryptocurrency transactions in Namibia in the absence of a method of detecting users and 
service providers who do not voluntarily submit themselves to such regulation. 
(b) Further Studies  
Due to the limitations of this dissertation, not all of the relevant avenues could be explored at 
great length, therefore it is recommended that further studies should be conducted to; 
(i) Determine a method of detecting when service providers are transacting in Namibia 
without a license or when users are transacting privately to or from Namibia, as recommended 
by FATF.1 Academics have conducted studies of linking a user’s internet protocol address to 
their private cryptographic key2 in order to reveal their geographical location.3 This may be 
useful for implementing detection methods. However, it raises privacy concerns that require 
further studies. As well as the fact that the newly passed Electronic Transaction ‘Bill’ does not 
place internet service providers under a general duty to monitor their customers.4  
(ii) Further studies should be conducted to determine international principles to assert 
jurisdiction in cyber law to avoid each country making its claim for jurisdiction in the absence 
of internationally accepted principles. 
  
 
1 The Financial Action Task Force ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism & Proliferation’ (June 2019) Recommendation 15 read with The Financial Action Task Force 
‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and Virtual Asset Service Providers’ (June 2019) paras 
83-4. 
2 Juhász PL et al ‘A Bayesian approach to identify Bitcoin’ (13 December 2018) PLOS ONE at 18. 
3 Ibid  




At the time of finalising this dissertation Namibia had passed the Bank of Namibia Bill (Bill) 
and it had subsequently been gazetted on the 4th February 2020,5 awaiting a commencement 
date from the Minister of Finance. Although the ‘Bill’s’ definition of currency excludes 
cryptocurrencies from the legal classification of money in Namibia, this dissertation still 
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